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NOTES
PREVAILING DEFENDANT FEE AWARDS IN CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGATION: A GROWING THREAT
TO PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
If a case is to be consideredfrivolous based on the length of the chancellor's
foot... the results are going to be unfortunate.'
INTRODUCTION
Who should bear the burden of attorney's fees is a question of ex-
treme importance to civil rights litigants in federal courts. Formerly,
civil rights plaintiffs could pursue private enforcement of their claims
only insofar as their wealth permitted.2 Contrary to practices in virtu-
ally every other Western nation,3 the prevailing party in American
federal litigation is, absent statutory authorization or enforce-
able contract,4 not ordinarily entitled to recover attorney's fees from
the losing party.5 Attorney's fees are currently available, however, to
1. Prochaska v. Marcoux, 632 F.2d 848, 855 (10th Cir. 1980) (Doyle, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2316 (1981).
2. Seattle School Dist. No. I v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980); Pickett v. Milam,
579 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1978). "[I]n general, legal services are available to individuals in direct
proportion to their ability and willingness to pay for them." R. ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLIENT
FEE ARRANGEMENTS: REGULATION AND REVIEW 120 (1980). See also Derfner, One Giant Step:
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 441, 442 (1977); Com-
ment, Attorney's Fees in Damage Actions Under the Civil Ri'ghts Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 332, 340 (1980).
3. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees andthe Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
792 (1966); McLaren, Barristers'Fees, 126 NEw LJ. 1180 (1976); Williams, Fee Shfting andPublic
Interest Litigation, 64 A.B.AJ. 859 (1978); Note, Attorney Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule,
25 DRAKE L. REv. 717 (1976). See generally ABA INTL & COMP. LAW SECTION PROCEEDINGS-
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMP. PROC. & PRAC. 119-42 (1962) [hereinafter referred to as
COMPARATIVE PROCEDURE].
4. Insertion of a contractual attorney's fee indemnity clause does not guarantee recovery of
fees. Courts will not enforce such provisions if they are contrary to public policy or unduly indefi-
nite. See United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1910); Missouri Pac. K.R. v. Winbum Tile Mfg.
Co., 461 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1972); Artvale, Inc. v. Rugby Fabrics Corp., 232 F. Supp. 814
(S.D.N.Y. 1964). See generally McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorneys Fees: A New Method of
Financing Legal Services, 40 FoRDHAm L. REv. 761, 770 (1972); Note, supra note 3, at 725-26.
5. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415 (1978); Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,247 (1975); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973); Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). See also Runyon v. McCrary,
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prevailing litigants under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 19766 (Awards Act) and its principal counterparts in Titles II7 and
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Together, these comprehensive
provisions and other limited enactments provide the statutory founda-
tion for fee shifting in virtually all private civil rights litigation.9
Congress included fee-shifting provisions in the legislative scheme to
encourage private enforcement by reducing the economic barrier to re-
lief for those most likely to confront violations of civil rights-minority
groups and the economically disadvantaged.10 Congress realized,
though, that eliminating these economic barriers increased the danger
of frivolous complaints and therefore saw the need to balance its pri-
vate enforcement objective against the perceived threat of spurious liti-
427 U.S. 160 (1976); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880); Stewart v. Sonnenborn, 98 U.S.
187 (1879); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.)
363 (1852); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
9. Other civil rights acts that permit fee awards include, e.g., Emergency School Aid Act of
1972, § 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976) (repealed 1978); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975,
§ 402, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1976); Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976).
10. Public interest groups have long sought to establish civil rights-public interest litigation
as an exception to the American rule on the basis of the special needs of the disadvantaged. See
generally COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANC-
ING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA (1976); The Awarding of.lttorneys Fees in Federal Courts.-
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, 95th
Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. 5 (1977-1978) (statement of Lenore Otrowsky) [hereinafter referred to as
Hearings: Fees in Federal Courts]; Nussbaum, Attorneyr Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48
N.Y.U. L. REV. 301 (1973); Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Servicesfor the Poor: Why and
How to Limit the Caseload, 46 J. URB. L. 217 (1969); Note, Allowance of Attorney Fees in Civil
RightsActions, 7 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 381 (1971); 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 145 (1979). Courts
and commentators have noted that the problem of financing civil rights litigation is not limited to
economically destitute members of society. One court has commented:
The doors to federal courthouses must remain open to all who have justiciable federal
causes of action. They must remain open not only to the rich and the poor, but also to
multitudes in between who do not qualify for publicly supported legal aid, and who can
afford the ever increasing costs of legal services only by great personal sacrifices.
Isaacs v. Temple Univ., 467 F. Supp. 67, 70 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Professor Nussbaum further states:
[Ilt is unhealthy in a democratic society for so few members of the legal profession to be
the only ones involved in litigating important public issues. For decades the profession
has devoted its best talents to serving wealthy individuals and large corporations, while
generally ignoring the needs of the average citizen. Such behavior in the long run can
only lead to suspicion on the part of the public.
Nussbaum, supra, at 308-09. See also R. ARONSON, supra note 2, at 128-30; Comment, Court
AwardedAttorney 's Fees and EqualAccess to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. Rv. 636, 656 (1974).
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gation.II Finding the proper balance, however, proved difficult.'2
Financial inducements to encourage individual enforcement of civil
rights laws enhance free access1 3 to judicial relief and promote compli-
ance with the law.' 4 Nevertheless, fee shifting threatens a correspond-
ing increase in the frequency of baseless court action.
Congress attempted to devise a method of shifting fees that would
encourage meritorious complaints while sufficiently deterring the insti-
gation or continuation of frivolous lawsuits. The civil rights fee-shift-
ing statutes employ a dual standard to govern judicial discretion in
awarding fees. 5 Prevailing plaintiffs serve as "private attorneys gen-
11. Congress expressed concern that fee-shifting provisions would encourage barratry-
proliferation of frivolous suits initiated to generate statutory fees-during its consideration of the
Awards Act. 122 CONG. REc. 31,474 (1976). Critics of the provision argued that § 1988 would
provide "bonanzas to the legal profession" and a "relief fund for lawyers." Id at 33,314 (remarks
of Sen. Kennedy). See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litiga-
tion, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1975).
The debates leading to the enactment of the Title VII fee-shifting provision (§ 706(k), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e)-5(k) (1976)) are "inconclusive." See United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519
F.2d 359, 362 (3d Cir. 1975); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1974).
Nevertheless, Senator Humphrey remarked: "Section 706(1) (sic) provides for the award of attor-
ney's fees to the prevailing party.... This should make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means
to bring a meritorious suit." 110 CONG. REc. 12,724 (1964). Senator Humphrey's statement, the
only substantive remark concerning the fee-shifting provision, illustrates the undoubted intent of
Congress to facilitate private enforcement of the Act. It also expresses the congressional concern
that litigants accomplish private enforcement with meritorious suits. See Heinsz, Attorney's Fees
for Prevailing Title VII Defendants: Toward a Workable Standard, 8 U. TOL. L. REv. 259, 262
(1977).
12. "As the law of Title VII fee awards developed, the tension between these objectives-
encouraging private enforcement versus avoiding encouragement of (and even discouraging) base-
less litigation--became increasingly obvious." Heinsz, supra note 11, at 262.
13. Promotion of free access is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, a system of fee
indemnification will increase the number of suits filed. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 294 (2d ed. 1977). On the other hand, the increase is offset somewhat by litigation of fee
disputes diverting substantial court time from substantive issues. See Hearings: Fees in Federal
Courts, supra note 10, at 24 (statement of Paul Nejelski). The amount of time attorneys devote to
fee entitlement reflects this phenomenon. See, e.g., Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp.
674 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (33% of total case hours); Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059 (D.D.C.
1976) (21% of total case hours).
14. Fee awards function financially and symbolically. Fee shifting concomitantly reduces
the high cost of legal services and taxes violators of the law for the cost of enforcement. Private
practitioners and public interest groups are more able to undertake lengthy and complicated trials
to enforce public rights. See Deriner, supra note 2, at 445; Note, Awards of Attorne's Fees to
LegalAid Offices, 87 HARV. L. REv. 411 (1973). "In 1975, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund was reported to have obtained approximately $550,000 of its annual $3 million litiga-
tion budget from court-awarded fees." R. ARONSON, supra note 2, at 128-29.
15. See note 93 infra and accompanying text.
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eral" because vindication of their civil rights benefits the entire com-
munity. Therefore, plaintiffs recover attorney's fees almost
automatically. 16 Prevailing defendants, by contrast, recover fees only
in suits that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.' 7
While prevailing defendant awards under the civil rights fee provi-
sions are designed to curb frivolous litigation, Congress regarded this
goal as secondary to the encouragement of private enforcement of the
civil rights laws."8 Recent federal decisions indicate that some courts,
in their zeal to discourage groundless claims, regularly impose fees on
good faith litigants who simply lose on the merits of their cases. 19 This
practice is flatly contrary to Congress' legislative goals.
As the number of cases improperly awarding fees to prevailing de-
fendants increases, the overriding private enforcement objective suffers.
Litigants cannot accurately assess whether their claims are sufficiently
well founded to avoid imposition of their opponents' fees. Inconsistent
fee awards deter potential litigants. This sort of "chilling effect"
portends serious consequences for developing areas of the law. Parties
will abandon novel legal theories for fear of incurring additional
expenses.20
To alleviate the problems presented by inconsistent prevailing de-
16. See notes 95-96 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 100 & 102 infra and accompanying text.
18. The Senate Judiciary Report accompanying S. 2278 (the Awards Act) emphasizes the
primacy of the private enforcement objective under the civil rights statutes:
The purpose and effect of S. 2278 are simple-it is designed to allow courts to provide
the familiar remedy of reasonable counsel fees to prevailing parties in suits to enforce the
civil rights acts which Congress has passed since 1866. ... All of these civil rights laws
depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have proved an essential rem-
edy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important
Congressional policies which these laws contain.
S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908,
5909-10.
This bill creates no startling new remedy. . . .It does not change the statutory provi-
sions regarding the protection of civil rights except as it provides the fee awards which
are necessary if citizens are to be able to effectively secure compliance with these existing
statutes.... Enforcement of the law depends on governmental action and, in some
cases, on private action through the courts. If the cost of private enforcement actions
becomes too great, there will be no private enforcement. If our civil rights laws are not
to become mere hollow pronouncements which the average citizen cannot enforce, we
must maintain the traditionally effective remedy of fee shifting in these cases.
id at 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913. See also Heinsz, supra
note 1 I, at 266-67 (examination of private enforcement objective in Title VII).
19. See notes 137 & 148-49 infra and accompanying text.
20. Hearings: Fees in Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 22 (statement of Paul Nejelski); Risin-
ger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil
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fendant fee awards, a legislative modification of the prevailing defend-
ant standard is required. This Note surveys the common-law
background of fee awards, examines current statutory provisions, and
analyzes the unacceptable uncertainty that exists in the defendant fee
award context. Alternative approaches to discourage frivolous suits are
then considered and utilized to develop a legislative reform proposal.
The proposal tailors current civil rights fee award provisions to accom-
modate more precisely the competing values of encouraging private en-
forcement and deterring baseless lawsuits.
I. THE COMMON-LAW BACKGROUND
A. The American Rule and Its Judicially-Created Exceptions
At the time of the American Revolution English courts awarded
counsel fees to prevailing parties in all types of cases at all levels of
litigation.2 Between 1799 and 1853 the federal courts in the United
Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1, 57 (1976). Legal innovation suffers when novel claims are
discouraged:
Today's frivolity may be tomorrow's law, and the law often grows by an organic pro-
cess in which a concept is conceived, then derided as absurd (and clearly not the law),
then accepted as theoretically tenable (though not the law), then accepted as the law
* How might the law have developed if, prior to 1954, an attorney might have been
sanctioned for asserting, contrary to settled Supreme Court case law, that separate but
equal was not equal?
Risinger, supra, at 57.
21. The "English rule," permitting recovery of costs by the prevailing party in a civil pro-
ceeding, was not a common-law right but rather the result of legislation allowing a defendant
subjected to malicious prosecution summarily to recover costs, including attorney's fees. Statute
of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. III, c. 1 (1269). As early as 1278, English courts awarded barrister honora-
riums (fees) to successful plaintiffs. Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 1 (1278). Since 1607, pre-
vailing defendants have received attorney's fees as well. Statute of Westminster, 4 Jac. 1, c. 3
(1606). See generall, Stabo v. Wagner, 245 F. 636 (2d Cir. 1917); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71
N.W. 558 (1897).
The current practice in England requires a hearing before special "taxing masters" after trial of
the substantive claims to determine the appropriateness and amount of an award. Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). See generally C. MCCORMICK,
LAW OF DAMAGES 234-36 (1935); Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 851-54 (1929); Note, Attor-
ney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGs L.J. 319, 320 (1977). The master
normally determines the amount by reference to fixed fee schedules that provide a standard sum
for each particular service (e.g., the drafting of a letter, or the filing of a brief) performed by the
lawyer. The fixed fee schedules that provide for reimbursement directly to the client, however, are
not necessarily sufficient to cover attorney's fees that the client incurs. For a collection of articles
on continental practices, see COMPARATIVE PROCEDURE, supra note 3, at 119-42.
The fundamental principle of the English method of cost distribution is that to recompense fully
a prevailing party for losses occasioned by a wrongdoer's acts, the measure of the loss must in-
dude the client's loss of fees paid to his attorney. See Falcon, Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil
Washington University Open Scholarship
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States followed the "English rule" and permitted the awarding of attor-
ney's fees to the extent permissible under state law.22 In 1853 Congress
enacted a statute23 to standardize the costs allowable in federal courts
that detailed the amounts recoverable from a losing party.24 Congress
substantially reenacted this provision in 1948, making allowance for
insignificant costs such as docket fees. 25 Courts have consistently de-
nied fee shifting beyond the statutory provisions initiated in the mid-
Rights and Constitutional Litigation, 33 MD. L. REV. 379, 381 n.4 (1973); Note, supra, at 321.
Other proponents of the English practice observe that the number of people, particularly the poor,
served by the legal profession increases if a strong incentive exists for an attorney to accept merito-
rious cases without regard to a client's ability to pay. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 798; Kuen-
zel, The Attorney's Fee., Why Not A Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REv. 75, 84 (1963). See
generally Greenberger, The Cost fJustice: An American Problem, An English Solution, 9 VILL. L.
REv. 400 (1964); McLaughlin, supra note 4; Posner, An Economic Approach to LegalProcedure and
JudicialAdministration, 2 . LEGAL STUDIES 399 (1973); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Includedin Costs.-
A Logical.Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 202 (1966); Tunney, Financing the Cost of Enforcing
LegalRights, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 632 (1974). Some authorities argue that the threat of losing and
therefore being burdened with attorneys' fees has inhibited parties from seeking relief in the com-
monwealth courts. See Mause, Winner Takes411. A Re-examination of the indemnity System, 55
IOWA L. REv. 26 (1969); Williams, supra note 3.
22. The Federal Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 78, §§ 9, 11, 12, 20-23, 35; Act of Sept.
29, 1789, 1 Stat. 93, § 2. Commentators disagree regarding the practices in early colonial courts.
Compare C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 4 (1913) (distrust of and disrespect
towards lawyers by colonial citizenry thwarted the adoption of awarding fees as costs) and Good-
hart, supra note 21, at 873 (same) with C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, at 235 (most colonial courts
adopted the English practice as evidenced by widespread use of statutory maximums) and Note,
Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 78, 80 n.17 (1953)
(same). Professor Ehrenzweig suggests that English practices were gradually replaced only as
statutory maximums became unrealistically low and lost their viability as compensatory mecha-
nisms. Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 799.
23. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161. A growing diversity in state court practices and
complaints of exorbitant fees by defeated litigants precipitated the legislation. See CONG. GLOBE
App., 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 207 (1853) (remarks of Sen. Bradbury), reprinted in Alyeska Pipeline
Sqrv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 251 n.24 (1975). The ultimate reason for the depar-
ture from English practices has been termed "a combination of historical accidents." Falcon,
supra note 21, at 381 n.5. For a complete summary of the statutory authorization for fee shifting
in this period, see Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247-50; S. LAW, THE JURISDICTION AND POWEaS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 255-82 (1852).
24. S. LAW, supra note 23, at 252-53.
25. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923 (1976); S. LAW, supra note 23, at 255. "Costs" generally do not
include attorney's fees. Recoverable costs are listed in § 1920, the successor to the 1853 Act:
(I) clerk and marshal fees; (2) court reporter and transcript fees; (3) printing and witness fees;
(4) fees for exemplification and copies of documents necessary for the case; (5) docket fees under
§ 1923; and (6) court-appointed expert witness and interpreter compensation. 28 U.S.C. § 1920
(1976). Attorney's fees are costs only in rare circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (Supp. IV 1980).
See notes 179-82 infra and accompanying text.
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nineteenth century as repugnant to the intent of Congress.26 Thus, the
general "American rule," that attorney's fees are not recoverable with-
out statutory authorization, emerged.
Scholars commonly forward several arguments to justify the Ameri-
can rule.27 The most persuasive argument is that the fee award acts
primarily as a penalty that courts should not impose upon a litigant for
merely exercising the right to prosecute or defend a lawsuit. 28 Propo-
nents of the rule maintain that the losing party is not always a wrong-
doer; the outcome of a lawsuit is not necessarily an indicator of right or
wrong.29 Additionally, courts and commentators have often argued
26. Until Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), the Supreme
Court acknowledged in many cases that courts, in the exercise of inherent equitable powers to do
justice, could tax counsel fees as costs. For instance, the Court held in 1939:
Allowance of [attorney's fees] in appropriate situations is part of the historic equity juris-
diction of the federal courts. . . . Plainly the foundation for the historic practice of
granting reimbursement for the costs of litigation other than the conventional taxable
costs is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular
situation.
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-66 (1939). More recently, the Court opined:
Although the traditional American rule ordinarily disfavors the allowance of attor-
neys' fees in the absence of statutory or contractual authorization, federal courts, in the
exercise of their equitable powers, may award attorneys' fees when the interests ofjustice
so require. . . [Flederal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power
whenever "overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery."
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973) (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92
(1970)) (footnotes omitted). See generaly Derfner, supra note 2, at 445-46 n.31; Derfner, The True
'4merican Rule Drafting Fee Legislation in the Public Interest, 2 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 251,253
n 8 (1979). Cf Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (recognizing courts' inherent
equitable power to impose fees on an attorney conducting litigation in bad faith).
27. See generall, D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 200-04 (1973); 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEY'S FEES 467
(1973); Note, Promoting the Vindication of Ciil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 347-48 (1980). See also Note, supra note 3; Note, supra note 21; Comment,
supra note 2; Note, The CivilRights Autorneys'Fees AwardsAct of 1976, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
205 (1977).
28. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 377 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1967), affdandmodtfied
390 U.S. 400 (1968). See also Falcon, supra note 21, at 384-85; Note, supra note 21, at 321. As
Professor Falcon recognizes, this argument depends on whether an unconditional right to litigate
exists.
29. Falcon, suvra note 21, at 385.
The scheme urged [the loser to pay all costs] is based on the wholly unwarranted as-
sumption that the losing party in litigation is always, or even ordinarily, in the wrong.
Its sole justification must be that an adverse verdict by a jury or an unfavorable decision
of the court carries with it the necessary conclusion that the defeated party was morally
culpable in bringing action, or in resisting suit, as the case may be. Nothing could be
further from the actual facts of life.. .. An enlightened Judge must realize that, in
spite of his most conscientious and painstaking efforts, he is, in a given case, as likely as
not to do injustice when he seeks to do justice.
Sattherwaite, Increasing Costs to be Paid by, Losing Party, 46 N.J.L.J. 133 (1923).
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that the American rule does not discourage private vindication of rights
by poor or moderate income litigants.30 A private party, it is asserted,
hesitates to sue if payment of the opposition's attorney's fees might be a
penalty for failure in court.3 ' The public interest bar strongly adheres
to this view.32 Courts have also expressed concern regarding attorney-
client conflict of interest33 and court congestion resulting from litiga-
tion to recover fees from prior suits. 34 Regardless of the relative merits
of the arguments for and against the American rule, however, it re-
mains a firmly entrenched principle.35
Apart from the early statutory provisions, courts using traditional eq-
uity powers derived several exceptions to the American rule. Federal
courts recognized the bad faith and common fund-substantial benefit
theories, as well as the now defunct private attorney general rationale.36
30. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (indigents);
Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 237 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (moderate
income litigants). See Falcon, supra note 21, at 384.
31. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). Professor
Dobbs explains: "The honestly suing plaintiff or the honestly defending defendant will be forced
to pay court costs and his own attorneys' fees if he loses. To superadd the burden of unknown
amounts of fees for his opponent may discourage his legitimate use of the courts as resolvers of
controversies." D. DOBBS, supra note 27, at 201. See also Sands, Attorneyr Fees as Recoverable
Costs, 63 A.B.A.J. 510, 513 (1977); Note, Attorney's Fees-Recovery by Prevailing Defendants in
Title VZIActions, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 627, 629 (1977).
This argument has been carried forward an additional step to conclude that the English rule is
undemocratic. Shifting the total cost of litigation to the loser has a greater impact on the poor,
386 U.S. at 718. See also Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's
FeeAwards Act, supra note 27, at 347.
32. Hearings: Fees in Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 5 (statement of Lenore Otrowsky); Id
at 59 (statement of Susan Goss).
33. The Supreme Court suggested this possibility in F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co.,
417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
34. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maler Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). See note
13 supra.
35. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939). The cases indicate that fee
awards will be granted "only in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons ofjustice" Id See
also note 5 supra and accompanying text.
36. The private attorney general theory is alive and well in many states. See, e.g., Anchorage
v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1977); Bergen County Sewer Auth. v. Borough of Bergenfield,
142 NJ. Super. 438, 361 A.2d 621 (1976) (dictum); Nassau Trust Co. v. Belfield, 89 Misc. 2d 282,
391 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Civ. Ct. 1977); Devas v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 535 P.2d 541 (1975).
The California legislature enacted a bill to award fees to private attorneys general if the suit
confers a significant public benefit, the burden of private enforcement necessitates an award, and
the interests of justice mandate that attorneys' fees not reduce the recovery, if any. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (Deering Supp. 1981). The bill illustrates the California legislature's ap-
proval of the private attorney general concept. Moreover, the California Supreme Court endorsed
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The Supreme Court very early held that the 1853 Act was consistent
with historic equity powers.37
1. Bad Faith38
The Judiciary Act of 178939 bestowed upon American equity courts
all the powers of the English chancery courts at the time that the
United States Constitution was adopted.' When the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure abolished the distinction between law and equity in the
federal system in 1938,41 courts expanded the equitable exceptions to
the no fee rule beyond equity proceedings alone.42 Courts maintained
the power to punish parties who conducted all or part of an action in
bad faith,43 that is, in a vexatious or wanton manner or for oppressive
reasons.
44
The bad faith concept encompasses both prior conduct that induces
the bill's theory a few days after its passage in Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141
Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
37. Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1946) (bad faith);
Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923) (willful disobedience of a
court order allows court to levy attorney's fees as part of the fine occurred); Trustees v. Green-
ough, 105 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1882) (common-fund exception sanctioned).
38. This exception is also referred to in the cases as "obdurate obstinacy," "wanton or
oppressive action," or "fraudulent, groundless or vexatious conduct." See generally Annot., 8 L.
Ed. 2d 894, 912-13 (1962) (collecting cases).
39. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
40. See Fontain v. Ravenal, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 384 (1855). See generally Note, supra
note 3, at 726; Note, supra note 21, at 324.
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
42. Compare Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928) (fraud),
rev'don othergrounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930) with Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th
Cir. 1951) (employment discrimination).
43. A court in its discretion could award fees to a bad faith litigant's opponent only to the
extent that the bad faith created additional costs. See, e.g., Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp.
630, 640-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), af'd in part and rev'd in part, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980); Signal
Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Truck Drivers Local 107, 68 F.R.D. 318, 322 (E.D. Pa. 1975). If, however,
the bad faith pervades the entire action the court could charge all of the opponent's fees against
the guilty party. See, eg., Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1979); Bell v.
School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963).
44. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). The Court left no doubt that the primary purpose of
the bad faith exception award is to punish frivolous or ill-motivated behavior and discourage
abuse of judicial process. The Court stated. "In this class of cases, the underlying rationale of
'fee-shifting' is, of course, punitive, and the essential element triggering the award of fees is there-
fore the existence of 'bad faith' on the part of the unsuccessful litigant." Id Accord, Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1980); National Resources Defense Council v. EPA,
484 F.2d 1331, 1333 (1st Cir. 1973). See Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128, 133 (6th Cir.
1979).
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unnecessary litigation45 and conduct occurring during the course of a
trial.46 Thus, the exception is now applicable whenever a party, obsti-
nately refusing to recognize another person's obvious legal rights,
forces the other party to sue for enforcement of those rights.4 7 Courts
award fees for bad faith when a plaintiff pursues a groundless suit,48 a
defendant maintains a patently baseless defense,49 or a party displays a
generally vexatious course of conduct throughout the litigation.5 °
45. An oft-cited admiralty case, Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962), illustrates the sort
of bad faith that induces pointless litigation and warrants fee shifting. The Supreme Court in-
cluded attorney's fees in the general damages awarded because of defendant's callous attitude in
refusing to investigate, admit, or deny the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 530-31. "As a result of that
recalcitrance, libellant was forced to hire a lawyer and go to court to get what was plainly owed
him under laws that are centuries old." 1d at 531. To the same effect is Haycraft v. Hollenbach,
606 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1979). In Haycraft, an intervenor's entrance into a school desegregation
case forced relitigation of issues already resolved by prior mandate of the court. Id at 133. Inter-
venor's attempt to enter an alternative desegregation plan that the court had previously rejected as
facially insufficient amounted to obstinacy in resisting plaintiffs' "realization of their clearly de-
fined legal rights." Id
46. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15
(1973).
47. See generally Note, supra note 3, at 727; Note, su.pra note 21, at 325; note 45 supra and
accompanying text.
48. See, eg., Gazan v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 6 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1934). In Gazan, the
court concluded that a stockholder action for injunctive relief lacked any legal or factual basis and
was brought for vexatious or oppressive reasons. Id Accord, Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City
S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928), rey'don othergroundss, 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
To invoke the bad faith exception courts must isolate some sort of culpable conduct or ill will.
A court cannot impose a fee award under the exception on the basis of "negligence, frivolity, or
improvidence." Cornwall v. Robinson, 645 F.2d 685, 687 (10th Cir. 1981).
49. See, eg., Gates v. Collier, 70 F.R.D. 341 (N.D. Miss. 1976). State prison officers, defend-
ing a class action on behalf of inmates alleging violation of constitutional rights, unreasonably
denied any violation in the face of evidence of their clear liability. When the futility of their
position became apparent, after considerable time had elapsed, the officials agreed to a stipulated
record. Plaintifis' attorney had incurred additional expenses because of defendants' unreasonable
adherence to a groundless defense and vexatious extenuation of the litigation. Id. at 345-46.
50. See, eg., Baas v. Elliot, 71 F.R.D. 693, 694 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Red School House, Inc. v.
OEO, 386 F. Supp. 1177, 1186-87 (D. Minn. 1974).
In Baas, the court granted the plaintiff attorney's fees when the defendant obtained removal to
federal court before reversing its position and attacking the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
The court found that the sole object of the tactic was to seek a dismissal otherwise unobtainable in
state court and stated that "[s]uch a frivolous, self-defeating invocation of federal procedure can-
not be countenanced." 71 F.R.D. at 694.
In Red School House, the district court granted plaintiffs' fees under the bad faith exception
because of the obdurate and contumacious conduct of the OEO's counsel throughout the trial.
The court described the disapproved conduct in detail:
[The OEO's conduct] constituted the most amazing and unacceptable conduct of an
agency of the United States that the Court has observed. On occasion, OEO refused to
produce witnesses as ordered by the Court, it failed to produce documents as ordered by
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Willful misconduct or bad faith by opposing counsel, in narrowly
defined circumstances, may also justify personal liability of the offend-
ing attorney for attorney's fees. The Supreme Court, in Roadway Ex-
press, Inc. v. Piper,51 recently acknowledged that a district court's
inherent disciplinary powers 52 could support imposition of attorney's
fees against an attorney. The Court reasoned that the authority of
courts over litigants and members of the bar is at least equivalent; both
clients and counsel who abuse judicial processes are potentially liable
for increased expenses.5 3 Roadway appears, however, to limit attorney
liability to extremely dilatory conduct.5
4
2. Common Fund or Substantial Beneft
Unlike the bad faith exception, fee awards under the common fund
rationale are premised on the positive benefit conferred by a party's
action. In Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert,5 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the traditional common fund exception to the American rule. The
Court held that a lawyer who recovers or preserves a common fund for
the benefit of third parties is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from
the Court after representing that it would do so, it resisted all reasonable efforts toward
reconciling its differences with the plaintiffs, and certain OEO officials even refused to
appear before the Court to attempt to justify such behavior. This conduct, in many
circumstances, bordered on the contumacious.
386 F. Supp. at 1186-87.
51. 447 U.S. 752 (1980). For one interpretation of the scope of Roadway Express, see 60 B.U.
L. REv. 950, 959-62 (1980) (arguing the case supports three distinct standards for attorney liability:
negligence, malice, and intentional abuse).
52. See generally Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L. REv.
264, 268 (1979).
53. Congress agreed with this proposition and responded by amending 28 U.S.C. § 1927
(1976) to include attorney's fees. Formerly, § 1927 provided: "Any attorney or other person ad-
mitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any territory thereof who so multiplies
the proceedings in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by
the court to satisfy personally such excess costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976) (emphasis added).
After the amendment, section 1927 now states:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasona-
bly and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs,
expenses, and attorney'sfees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
54. Subjective bad faith is a prerequisite to any consideration of sanctions. 447 U.S. at 767.
See Nemeroffv. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 1980); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm.
v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088-89 (2d Cir. 1977); Foley v. Devaney, 528 F.2d 888, 891-92
(3d Cir. 1976). See also 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PACrICE 54.77[2], at 1709 (2d ed. 1981).
55. 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
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the fund as a whole.16 The Court observed that this doctrine, reflecting
traditional practices in the equity courts,57 represents a well-recognized
exception to the general principle that each litigant must bear the ex-
pense of his own representation. But the Court further held that the
common fund exception applies only "when each member of a certified
class has an undisputed and mathematically ascertainable claim to part
of a lump sum judgment recovered on his behalf."5 9 The Boeing deci-
sion illustrates the Court's disinclination to extend60 the common fund
theory to cases that seek nonmonetary benefits on behalf of the general
public. 61
56. Id at 478. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 390-97 (1970). See also
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166-67 (1939).
57. 444 U.S. at 478. See Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); Trustees
v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
58. 444 U.S. at 478; Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (bad
faith and common fund exceptions expressly approved). See notes 21-26 supra and accompanying
text.
59. 444 U.S. at 479.
60. In declining to extend the common fund-substantial benefit doctrine in,40ieska the Court
commented:
[]n this Court's common-fund and common-benefit decisions, the classes of beneficiaries
were small in number and easily identifiable. The benefits could be traced with some
accuracy, and there was reason for confidence that the costs could indeed be shifted with
some exactitude to those benefiting. In this case, however, sophisticated economic analy-
sis would be required to gauge the extent to which the general public, the supposed
beneficiary, as distinguished from selected elements of it, would bear the costs.
421 U.S. 240, 264-65 n.39. Justice Marshall favored extension of the common fund or benefit
exception. Id at 272 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. Aoeska and Boeing in tandem seemingly undercut, without expressly disavowing, prior
Supreme Court decisions that suggested a relaxation of the traditional hard-line approach of the
Court towards attorney's fee awards without statutory authorization. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1
(1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
Mills involved a shareholders' derivative suit under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)) to dissolve a corporate merger approved by the shareholders but
tainted by a misleading proxy statement. Relying on Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d
Cir. 1943) (attorney's fees awarded despite the lack of any statutory provision in § 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976)), Justice Harlan awarded fees to the
stockholder's attorney from the corporation on the theory that the expenses of the plaintiffs law-
suit had been incurred "for the benefit of the corporation and the other shareholders." 396 U.S. at
392. Despite the holding in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719
(1967), that courts should not develop exceptions to the traditional rule "in the context of statutory
causes of action for which the legislature had provided intricate remedies," the Court ignored the
fact that § 14(a) was silent on the question of fees whereas §§ 9(3) and 18(a) provided fee-shifting
remedies. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976). Once tied to the common fund exception, the Court
was obliged to hold that the creation of an actual monetary fund was not essential, and so recog-
nized: "The fact that this suit has not yet produced, and may never produce, a monetary recovery
from which the fees would be paid does not preclude an award based on this rationale." 396 U.S.
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3. Private Attorney General
The private attorney general exception emerged as a federal exten-
sion of the common benefit rationale.62 Under this short-lived excep-
tion to the American rule, federal courts regularly shifted fees to
reimburse plaintiffs who sued to enforce statutes pertaining to impor-
tant public rights.63 Even absent statutory authorization, federal courts
awarded fees as a matter of course' to private parties vindicating
at 392. Mills could be read narrowly to hold that a corporation should reimburse a shareholder
for the costs of establishing a violation of the securities laws by the corporation regardless of
whether the corporation obtained an actual money recovery from the derivative suit. Id at 389-
90. The decision, however, is generally considered an extension of the rationale in Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968). See notes 93-94 infra and accompanying text.
In Hall, the Court awarded a union member attorney's fees after he prevailed in an action for
denial of free speech against a labor union. The Court reimbursed the plaintiff because he had
dispelled the "chill" cast upon all other members of the union. The Court's reliance on Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), and Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161
(1939) (action brought against insolvent banks and their receiver to impress a lien on certain trust
funds in favor of petitioner and third parties), places the case squarely within the common fund
exception. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258 (1975).
The Hall, Mills, and Sprague decisions indicate that a plaintiff may obtain reimbursement of
his attorney's fees when, though not in a technical sense suing for the benefit of others or to create
a common fund, the litigant has secured a judgment with the effect of establishing the rights of a
discernible class of persons. 412 U.S. at 13; 396 U.S. at 396; 307 U.S. at 167.
62. The private attorney general theory is closely akin to the benefit analysis applied in Mills
and Hall. See note 60 supra. "In concept the benefit theory is defensive, preventing unjust enrich-
ment by taxing the true beneficiaries of the litigation, while the private attorney general theory is
offensive, promoting the effective implementation of public policy by taxing the defendant."
Comment, supra note 2, at 667-68. For extended discussion of the private attorney general doc-
trine prior to Ayeska, see Derfner, supra note 2, at 443-45; Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 301. See
also Note, Private Attorney General Fees Emergefrom the flglderness, 43 FORDHAM L. Rv. 258
(1974); Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the 'rivate Attorney General':" Judicial Green Light to
Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HAsTINGs L.J. 733 (1973).
63. A flurry of cases following the private attorney general rationale and awarding fees with-
out statutory authorization emerged in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968). See, e.g., Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (Ist Cir.
1975); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th
Cir. 1974); Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1974); Cornist v. Richland Parish School Bd., 495
F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Fairley v.
Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974); Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973); Cooper v.
Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern
Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal.
1972), afjd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974). The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals presaged A/yeska by never adopting the private attorney general exception. See
Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 327-31 (4th Cir. 1972), rev'don other grounds, 416 U.S. 696
(1974).
64. The Supreme Court held that "prevailing plaintiffs" under the Title II and Title VII fee-
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strong congressional policies. 6 One court, although recognizing that
the private attorney general rationale could not be utilized to subvert
completely the American rule, nevertheless ruled that courts should ap-
ply the theory whenever "nothing in a statutory scheme.., might be
interpreted as precluding it. ' '66
The Supreme Court abruptly foreclosed the shifting of attorney's
fees under the private attorney general theory in federal litigation, ab-
sent specific statutory authorization, in the landmark decision of Ay-
eska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.67  Environmental
groups successfully brought suit to quash the Secretary of the Interior's
issuance of permits required for construction of the trans-Alaska oil
pipeline. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals granted
the plaintiffs' attorney's fees under the private attorney general ration-
ale.68 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Congress, not the ju-
diciary, should determine which statutes further such substantial public
policies as to warrant fee awards.69 The 4yeska Court thus severely
limited the previously unquestioned power of federal courts to award
shifting provisions "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400,402 (1968) (Title
I1). A4ccord, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975) (Title VII). See also North-
cross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (applying same standard under § 718 of the Emer-
gency School Aid Act of 1972. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976)). The lower courts transferred the
prevailing plaintiff statutory standard to common-law private attorney general cases. See note 63
supra and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974) (racial employment
discrimination); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974) (welfare discrimina-
tion against nonresidents); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972) (freedom of
speech), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972) (rental
of public housing). See generaly Derfher, supra note 2, at 443; Derfner, supra note 26, at 252 n.6.
66. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972), af'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974). The court cited three criteria for recovery under the
private attorney general exception: "the strength of the Congressional policy, the number of peo-
ple benefited by the litigants' efforts, and the necessity and financial burden of private enforce-
ment." Id. at 99.
67. 421 U.S. 240, 269-71 (1975).
68. Wilderness Soe'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
69. The Court reviewed the development of the traditional American rule that, in conjunc-
tion with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923(c) (1970) (current version 1976 & Supp. 111 1979), evidenced
Congress' intent ordinarily to limit fee awards to the sums provided in § 1923(c). 421 U.S. at 255-
57. Recognizing the continuing validity of the common fund or benefit and bad faith exceptions,
id at 259, the Court nevertheless found that "Congress has not. . . extended any roving authority
to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them
warranted." Id at 260. The Court held that "the circumstances under which attorneys' fees are to
be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters for
Congress to determine." Id at 262. See also note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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fees on a private attorney general rationale.7 0
II. STATUTORY FEE SHIFTING
A. Generally
Statutory fee-shifting provisions are becoming increasingly available
in many areas of the law, partially as a legislative response to Aly-
eska,71 but more fundamentally to augment public statutory regula-
tions with private enforcement. 72  Fee legislation is appropriately
analyzed at two levels. The first level defines the breadth of the inter-
ests promoted and the second level identifies the circumstances that
permit fee awards and the parties to whom such fees are awarded.
With respect to the interests promoted, three categories of fee legisla-
tion exist. An omnibus provision 73 authorizes fee shifting in any civil
litigation,74 whether the interests are public or private.75 A specific pro-
70. The federal courts were in general agreement as to the justifications for private attorney
general fee shifting:
Since someone must bear the cost of litigation, it is better that the adverse party do so,
even though he may not have acted in bad faith. Otherwise, the "private attorney gen-
eral" would be penalized by the significant cost of litigation for furthering important
public interests through his individual suit. Without reimbursement for attorney fees,
private litigants often could not protect the rights the law grants them. There should be
no price tag on the enjoyment of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.
Incarcerated Men v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 285 (6th Cir. 1974).
[T]his court feels that in equitable suits to remedy violations of fourth amendment rights
... an award of attorney's fees as costs is within the court's power and responsibility.
Where as here fee shifting is necessary to insure the vindication of important constitu-
tional rights and appropriate because of the inadequate remedies otherwise available,
because it is consistent with a remedy increasingly furnished by Congress, and because
of the high social value placed upon the rights involved, an award of attorney's fees as
costs is essential, lest these important rights be relegated to a mere platitude.
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 24-25 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547, rehk'g
denied 439 U.S. 885 (1978) (footnote omitted).
71. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Major legislative
revisions, e.g., Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(2)
(1976); new public interests statutes, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(2)
(1976); State & Local Fiscal Assistance Amendments of 1976,31 U.S.C. § 1244(c) (1976); and the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), all providing for fee-
shifting, illustrate the immediate congressional reaction to Alyeska.
72. See notes 10, 11 & 18 supra and accompanying text.
73. An omnibus provision would codify the English Rule in all federal civil litigation if it
specified mandatory fee-shifting.
74. See generally Derfner, supra note 26, at 255-56. Mary Frances Derfner, the Director of
the Attorneys' Fees Project, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, originated the
breadth analysis of the fee legislation, employing the terms omnibus, specific, and generic to de-
fine the three categories of fee statutes.
75. Congress has provided fee-shifting provisions for few private causes of action. Most,
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vision permits fee shifting under a single statute or statute section.76 A
generic provision allows fee awards in cases that fall into a specifiable
category.77
In the second level, the types of statutory provisions generally fall
into three categories. First, the statute may provide mandatory fee re-
imbursement to a prevailing plaintiff.78 Second, the provision may give
the court discretion to award fees, in exceptional circumstances, to ei-
ther party to prevent gross injustice.79 The third type of statute allows
broad judicial discretion to balance equitable factors in awarding fees
to prevailing parties.80
however, involve private issues with substantial impact on the public. See, e.g., The Plant Variety
Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2565 (1976); Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976); Patent
Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976).
76. See Derfner, supra note 26, at 259 n.26.
77. The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), is the paradigm
generic provision. Congress deemed fee awards essential to civil rights suits generally, and pro-
vided for them under six civil rights statutes in the Awards Act. See Derfner, supra note 26, at
262-68.
78. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1976 & Supp. 111 1979); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11705(d)(3) (Supp. III
1979); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976); Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. § 206 (1976); Merchant Marine Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1976); Packers and Stockyards Act,
7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1976); Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1976);
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§ 153(p) (1976).
79. In patent litigation "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees
to the prevailing party." 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976).
80. In addition to the civil rights fee-shifting provisions, see notes 7-9 supra and accompany-
ing text, the following statutes are examples of provisions that allow considerable discretion: Se-
curities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976); Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1976);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 116 (1976); Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 3205 (Supp. Il 1979); Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (Supp. III 1979); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3612(c) (1976); and Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (1976).
The analysis will develop in some detail the following fee-shifting civil rights statutes: Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976); The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). This is not to suggest that these are the only statutes
with similar provisions or that the analysis presented is relevant to only these three. Congress has
employed similar language in at least 25 statutes that courts have interpreted to authorize recov-
eries by defendants. See, e.g., Federal Contested Election Act, 2 U.S.C. § 396 (1976); Agricultural
Fair Practices Act of 1967, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2305(a), -(c) (1976); Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2565 (1976); Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1976); Railroad Reorganization Act of
1935, 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(12) (1976); Corporate Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 641-644 (1976);
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976); Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a)
(1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976); Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 116 (1976); Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976); Employee Retire-
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In both analytical levels, policy choices shape the contours of fee-
shifting provisions. In the first level, for instance, an omnibus statute
would require drastic alteration of the American rule."' Specific provi-
sions permit development of standards to accomplish particular statu-
tory goals, but impose a tremendous legislative burden on Congress.8 2
Generic provisions lessen that burden somewhat because Congress can
isolate areas that need special treatment and develop standards for sub-
stantive areas categorically.83 Similarly, in the second level the deci-
sion to award fees to defendants depends on the perceived threat of
spurious litigation. Moreover, the standards devised to instruct courts
as to when awards are appropriate-mandatory, exceptional circum-
stances, or wide discretion-are related to the strength of the private
enforcement policy.
B. Civil Rights Fee-Shfting Statutes
Statutory fee awards are available in the civil rights context in both
specific84 and generic forms.8 5 Congress passed the Civil Rights Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 in order "to remedy anomalous gaps in
our civil rights laws created by. . .Alyeska,. . and to achieve consis-
ment Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1976); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976); Ocean Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (1976); Deepwater Port Act
of 1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1976); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976); Servicemen's Group Life
Insurance Act, 38 U.S.C. § 784(g) (1976); Veterans Benefit Act, 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c) (1976); Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(e)(e) (1976); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(d) (Supp. III 1979); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 491 l(d) (1976); Interstate Com-
merce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11708(c) (Supp. I 1979). In sum, more than 90 federal statutes confer a
right to recover attorney's fees as part of the relief granted. For extensive compilations, see R.
ARONSON, supra note 2, at 156; Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is 'Reasonable'?,
126 U. PA. L. REv. 281 (1977).
81. See note 73 supra and accompanying text. See generally Derfner, supra note 26, at 255.
82. For instance, in patent and trademark litigation Congress permits fee shifting "in excep-
tional circumstances" to plaintiffs and defendants because primarily private interests are impli-
cated. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976); Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976).
Similarly, the Norris-LaGuardia Act provision permits fee awards only to defendants because
defendants enforce federal rights. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1976). See Derfner,
supra note 26, at 259. This approach, however, requires individual congressional consideration of
fee bills for new statutes, and reconsideration of existing statutes to determine the appropriateness
of fee awards. See Derfner, supra note 26, at 260-61.
83. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 204(b), 706(k), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k)
(1976).
85. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
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tency in our civil rights laws."86 Specifically, Congress designed the
Awards Act to parallel fee-shifting mechanisms in Titles II and VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.87 Congress intended for the courts to read
the Acts in par! materia and follow previous constructionsa8 placed
upon the "prevailing party" language utilized in the Awards Act.89 Ti-
tles II and VII include specific fee provisions that apply only to actions
under each respective title.90 The Awards Act, however, is generic,
promoting enforcement of various statutes.91 Thus, the provisions dif-
fer in scope but apply identical standards. The Acts provide for fee
86. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 18, at 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5908, 5909. For an overview of the Act and its legislative history, see Larson, The Civil Rightr
Attorney's Fee/wards Act of1976, 10 CLEARINOHOUSE REv. 778 (1977); Wolf, In the Public Inter-
est: Attomey's Fees in Civil Rights Cases, DISTRICT LAW., Winter 1976, at 32; Note, The Civil
RightsAttorneys'FeesAwardsAct of 1976, supra note 27. For detailed analyses of the legislative
history, see SuBcoMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIOHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976 SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, TExTS, AND OTHER ENACTMENTS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); M. DERFNER, LEOISLATIVE
HISTORY: CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976 (1976); Derfner, supra note 2;
Lipson, BeyondAlyesa-Judicial Response to the Civil Rights A/ltorneys' Fees Awards Act, 22 ST.
LouIs U.L.J. 243 (1978); Malson, In Response to Alyeska-The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees/wards
Act of1976, 21 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 430 (1977).
87. See notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text. Congress considered it critical to remedy an
anomaly: courts permitted fee awards in some civil rights cases and refused them in others. S.
REP. No. 1011, supra note 18, at 4, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5911-
12.
88. S. RaP. No. 1011, supra note 18, at 4-5, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5908, 5911-13; H.R. RP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1976). The lower courts have fol-
lowed Congress' directive to apply the same standards under the fee provisions. See, e.g., Collins
v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1981); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v.
Washington, 633 F.2d 1338, 1348 (9th Cir. 1980); LeGare v. University of Pa. Medical School, 488
F. Supp. 1250, 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
89. The relevant language in the statutes is virtually identical. Section 1988 provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and
1986 of this title, title IX.... or in any civil action... charging a violation of... title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow theprevalling
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 contains its own attorney fee provision.
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the Commission [EEOC] or the United States, a reason-
able attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall
be liable for costs the same as a private person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976) (emphasis added). The Title II fee award provision provides in
pertinent part: "In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee." 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
90. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
91. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
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shifting to civil rights litigants in a broad range of civil rights actions.92
The Awards Act and its counterparts in Titles II and VII stipulate
that prevailing parties in certain civil rights actions may, as a matter of
judicial discretion, recover reasonable attorney's fees. The legislative
history of the Awards Act instructs courts to follow a dual standard,
developed legislatively and judicially, to effectuate the paramount pri-
vate enforcement objective.93
92. The Awards Act applies to causes of action for damages or equitable relief under the
following civil rights statutes: 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), proscribing race discrimination in employ-
ment and contractual relationships by government officials and private persons (see, ag., Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975)); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation
Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973)); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976), prohibiting discrimination in real estate
transactions (see, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp.
11I 1979), forbidding the denial of constitutional and civil rights by persons acting under color of
state law (see, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Supp. 111 1979), chal-
lenging public or private conspiracies to deny equal protection of the laws (see, ag., Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971)); 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976), providing a cause of action against
public officials with the power to prevent violations of § 1985 but who fail to do so; 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1976) (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), proscribing discrimination on the basis
of race, color, or national origin in all federally-funded programs (see, eg., Hills v. Gautreaux,
425 U.S. 284 (1976); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)); and 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (Title IX),
prohibiting discrimination on account of sex, blindness, or visual impairment in federally-assisted
education activities.
Congress enacted Title VII to secure equal employment opportunity irrespective of race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin. Employers are prohibited from using these characteristics as cri-
teria for hiring, firing, disciplining, discriminating, or classifying applicants or employees in a
detrimental fashion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
See generaliy Walker, Recovery of Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Litigation, 39 ALA. LAW. 93, 99
n.45 (1978).
Title II seeks to eliminate discrimination in public accommodations based on state laws classify-
mg persons on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000b
(1976). See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968). See also note 9 supra and
accompanying text.
The Awards Act also permits, under certain circumstances, an award of fees to a litigant against
whom the United States has asserted a tax deficiency. See generally Patzkowski v. United States,
576 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1978); Elientuck, Holub & SolomonAttorneys'FeesAwards in Tax it,'iga-
tion Now Available to Succes.9fd Lfigants, 46 J. TAX. 157 (1977); Note, Attorxeys' Fees in Tax
Lftigatimn Remedying the Substantve Imbalance, 45 BRoOKLYN L. REV. 53 (1978); Note, Court
AwardedAttorneys' Fees in Tax Litigation" 42 U.S.C § 988, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1368 (1978).
Further discussion of fee awards in this context is beyond the scope of this Note.
93. Representative Drinan, the Awards Act's sponsor and floor manager in the House, coined
the term "double standard" to describe the application of the prevailing party language. 122
CONG. REc. H12,160 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976). Congress intended that prevailing plaintiffs should
receive fees as a matter of course, whereas prevailing defendants were limited to exceptional cir-
cumstances of bad faith or harassment. See S. REP. No. 1011, .afra note 18, at 4-5, repr/nted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5953-54; H.R. REP. No. 1558, jupra note 88, at 6-7,8;
122 CoNG. REc. S16,390 (daily ed. Sept. 22,1976) (remarks of Sen. Bumpers, discussing unoffered
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Prevailing plaintiffs serve as private attorneys general within this
scheme and accordingly are afforded preferential treatment. The legis-
lative history of the Awards Act indicates that the liberal standard an-
nounced in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises94 limits judicial
discretion to deny prevailing plaintiff fee awards.95 In Newman, a pre-
Awards Act Title II decision, the Supreme Court held that "one who
succeeds. . . should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust." 96
amendment); 122 CONG. Rac. S16,491 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Bauman); 122
CONG. REc. H12,159-60 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan); 122 CONG. REc.
H12,160-61 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan); 122 CONG. REC. H12,160-65 (daily
ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of Reps. White & Drinan); 122 CONG. REC. H12,162 (daily ed. Oct. 1,
1976) (remarks of Reps. Kastenmeier & Bauman); 122 CONG. REC. H12,164-65 (daily ed, Oct. 1,
1976) (remarks of Reps. Jordan & Bauman); 122 CONG. REc. H12,165-66 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976)
(remarks of Rep. Seiberling).
94. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
95. The prevailing party plaintiff standard flows from Supreme Court opinions in Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam), and Northcross v. Board of
Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (per curiam). Congress cited these cases with approval in S. REP. No.
1011, supra note 18, and in H. REP. No. 1558, supra note 88.
The standard finds broad acceptance in the lower courts. See, e.g., Collins v. Chandler Unified
School Dist., 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981); Murphy v. Kolovits, 635 F.2d 662 (7th Cir. 1981);
Staten v. Housing Auth., 638 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1980); Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316
(4th Cir. 1980); Entertainment Concepts, Inc., III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127 (10th Cir.
1980); Swietlowich v. County of Bucks, 620 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1980); McManama v. Lukhard, 616
F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1980); Perez v. University of Puerto Rico, 600 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979); Dawson v.
Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979); Bones v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316 (3d Cir. 1979); Pickett v.
Milam, 579 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1978); Hickman v. Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 513 F.
Supp. 659 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 500 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Mo. 1980);
Rheuark v. Shaw, 477 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Tex. 1979), a 'd in part and rev'd in part, 628 F.2d 297
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981); Massachusetts Fair Share v. O'Keefe, 476 F.
Supp. 294 (D. Mass. 1979); Martin v. Wray, 473 F. Supp. 1131 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Ohland v. City of
Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324 (D. Vt. 1979).
96. 390 U.S. at 402. The question of what constitutes special circumstances to preclude an
award remains somewhat uncertain. Courts are split on whether financial ability to pay consti-
tutes a special circumstance. Compare Ellwest Stereo Theatre, Inc. v. Jackson, 653 F.2d 1248 (9th
Cir. 1981) (not a special circumstance); Entertainment Concepts, Inc. III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d
497 (7th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); Aware Woman Clinic, Inc. v. City of
Cocoa Beach, 629 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1980) (same) and Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635 (5th
Cir. 1979) (same) with Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979) (contingent fee-recovery
prospects bright). Although good faith is not a defense to a prevailing plaintitFs request for attor-
ney's fees, eg., Ellwest Stereo Theatre, Inc. v. Jackson, 653 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1981); Teitelbaum v.
Sorenson, 648 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1981); Winslow v. Kansas Bd. of State Fair Managers, 512 F.
Supp. 576 (D. Kan. 1981); Lackey v. Bowling, 476 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. 11M. 1979), courts generally
seek to balance all circumstances in the case. See Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 633
F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Mississippi,
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Prevailing defendant fee awards serve a fundamentally different pur-
pose than plaintiff awards. Judicial discretion to grant defendant fee
awards is limited. Courts therefore have difficulty justifying awards to
prevailing defendants notwithstanding the need to deter baseless
claims.97 One court indicated that because civil rights defendants are
not "cloaked in a mantle of public interest," there was no compelling
reason to permit customary defendant fee recoveries.98 Moreover, if
courts allowed defendants to recover fees under the prevailing plaintiff
standard it would undermine the congressional private enforcement
objective. The prospect of paying opponents' counsel would discour-
age impecunious plaintiffs from seeking judicial redress unless their
claims were very strong.99
Congress, recognizing these concerns, provided for defendant fee
awards from plaintiffs "only if the action is vexatious and frivolous, or
if the plaintiff has instituted it solely to 'harass or embarrass' the de-
fendant."'" In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC'0 the Supreme
Court semantically modified this standard by holding that courts
should award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant "upon a finding
that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foun-
dation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith."' 2
606 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1979); Cairo v. Skow, 510 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Wis. 1981). Other courts
apportion fees based on the relative success of the parties. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1981); Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1981); Gurule
v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1980); Miller v. Carson, 628 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1980); Johnson v.
Nordstrom-Larpenteur Agency, Inc., 623 F.2d 1279 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1042 (1980);
Stenson v. Blum, 512 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). But cf. Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 500
F. Supp. 176, 179-80 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (impossible to segregate work performed on successful and
unsuccessful claims-normally award covers both successful and unsuccessful issues). Other
courts have denied or limited recovery when adequate independent damages are recovered or the
prospect of recovery is sufficient to attract competent counsel on a contingent fee basis. See
Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979); Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). This view is inconsistent with the overriding private enforcement
objective of the Acts. Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1978). "The Court should
address the issue of entitlement as an antecedent and separate question, applying the Newman
standard, without regard to the existence of a private fee arrangement." Id at 648.
97. See Heinsz, supra note 11, at 268-74.
98. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 1975).
99. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
100. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 88, at 7. See also S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 18, at 5,
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912-15.
101. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
102. Id at 421. The standard for prevailing defendants-whether the plaintifi's action was
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation-was determined by the Supreme Court in Chris-
tiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415-22 (1978), by approval of the standards em-
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Exercise of judicial discretion to award fees under these standards
occurs only after a court deems a plaintiff or defendant a "prevailing
party." If a civil rights plaintiff succeeds in obtaining the essential re-
lief sought on the merits, the plaintiff has prevailed and will normally
procure a fee award.1 3 A successful plaintiff whose case ends in a set-
tlement or consent decree is considered a prevailing party for fee-shift-
ing purposes."°  Similarly, if a lawsuit is the catalyst behind a
defendant's voluntary compliance with a civil rights statute, the plain-
tiff prevails for fee purposes despite the nonjudicial nature of the re-
ployed in the Second and Third Circuits in Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976),
and United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975). The rule is now well
settled. See Wooten v. Clifton Forge School Bd., 655 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1981); Harbulak v. Suf-
folk County, 654 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1981); Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d
1227 (5th Cir. 1981); Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980); Lujan v. New Mexico Health &
Social Serv. Dep't, 624 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Josten's Am. Yearbook Co., 624 F.2d
125 (10th Cir. 1980); Anthony v. Marion County Gen. Hosp., 617 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1980); Craw-
ford v. Western Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980); Luna v. Aerospace Workers Local 36,
614 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1980); Bowers v. Kraft Foods Corp., 606 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1979); Hemas v.
City of Hickory Hills, 517 F. Supp. 592 (N.D. IML 1981); EEOC v. Chandelle Club, 506 F. Supp. 75
(W.D. Okla. 1980); Barriner v. Stedman, 504 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Thompson v. Village
of Evergreen Park, 503 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. IlL 1980). Initially, however, some courts failed to
apply the dual standard. The Fifth Circuit, for example, previously held that the same standards
should apply to both plaintiffs and defendants in Title VII fee awards, and allowed prevailing
defendants to recover as a matter of course. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 558 F.2d
742, 744 (5th Cir. 1977). The courts, however, eventually recognized the double standard. Craw-
ford v. Western Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1321 (5th Cir. 1980). Seegenerally notes 95 & 101 supra
and accompanying text.
103. See Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980); Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Swietlowich v. County of Bucks, 620 F.2d 33 (3d
Cir. 1980); Hirschkop v. Snead, 475 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Va. 1979), a 'd, 646 F.2d 149 (4th Cir.
1981); Brown v. American Enka Corp., 452 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). If judicial relief is
obtained in any form most courts hold that the prevailing plaintiff is entitled to fees, even if only
nominal damages or injunctive relief is received. Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1981)
(injunction); Skoda v. Fontani, 646 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1981) (nominal damages-S 1.00); Perez v.
University of Puerto Rico, 600 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979) (nominal damages); Dunten v. Kibler, 518 F.
Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (nominal damages-S1.00, a "moral victory"); Rheuark v. Shaw, 477
F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (nominal damages), afdin part andrev'dinpart, 628 F.2d 297 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981).
104. See Bonnes v. Long, 651 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1981); Collins v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1203 (5th
Cir. 1981); Williams v. City of Fairburn, 640 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1981); Seattle School Dist. No. I v.
Washington, 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980); Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir.
1980); Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1980); Dayan v. Board of Regents, 620 F.2d 107
(5th Cir. 1980); Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1980); Young v. Kenley, 614 F.2d 373
(4th Cir. 1979); Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Massachusetts Fair Share v.
O'Keefe, 476 F. Supp. 294 (D. Mass. 1979). See generally Note, Adminisirative Law. Recovery of
Attorney's Fees by Prevailing Plainqr's in Y7'tle VII Actlon, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 98 (1980).
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lief. "5 Nevertheless, courts may deny fee awards when it is determined
that a defendant settled to avoid the nuisance of litigation.10 6
The circumstances in which a defendant "prevails" for fee purposes
are predictably more narrowly defined.107 Normally, a defendant must
105. Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1980); Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199 (8th
Cir. 1980); Dayan v. Board of Regents, 620 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411
(3d Cir. 1979); Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316
(4th Cir. 1979); Massachusetts Fair Share v. O'Keefe, 476 F. Supp. 294 (D. Mass. 1979).
Courts are in general agreement as to the burden to be carried to establish prevalence for fee
purposes. In Maonrion the court dismissed as moot the plaintiffs' action challenging a district
judge's practice of summarily sending convicted indigents to jail for petty offenses without first
affording a right to counsel because the judge had ceased the practice. 627 F.2d at 671. The court
granted plaintiffs motion for attorney's fees because plaintiff had essentially succeeded in ob-
taining the relief sought. The court further held that there must be a causal relationshp between
the action and the ultimate relief received. Id. When more than one cause contributes to the
cessation of improper conduct, a plaintiff prevails if suit was a materialfactor in bringing about
defendant's action. Id Another court crystallized these considerations into three requirements:
(1) some improvement in the party's position; (2) suit and attorney's efforts were "necessary and
important" factor in achieving improvement; and (3) defendant's concessions were legally com-
pelled. Massachusetts Fair Share v. O'Keefe, 476 F. Supp. 294, 297 (D. Mass. 1979). See also
American Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1981); Iranian Students Ass'n v.
Sawyer, 639 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1981); Coen v. Harrison County School Bd., 638 F.2d 24 (5th Cir.
1981).
106. See Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 352 (4th Cir. 1980); Chicano Police Of-
ficer's Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 131 (10th Cir. 1980); Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059,
1064 (D.D.C. 1976), a~fdsub nom. Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
107. See generally Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Josten's Am. Year-
book Co., 624 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1980); Anthony v. Marion County Gen. Hosp., 617 F.2d 1164
(5th Cir. 1980); Harris v. Plastics Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1980); Luna v. International
Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers Local 36, 614 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1980); Jones v. United
States, 613 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1980); Farad v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1979);
Bowers v. Kraft Foods Corp., 606 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1979); Olitsky v. O'Malley, 597 F.2d 303 (1st
Cir. 1979); EEOC v. First AlL Bank, 595 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1979); Bennett v. Cramer, 495 F.
Supp. 191 (E.D. Wis. 1980); LeGare v. University of Pa. Medical School, 488 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D.
Pa. 1980); Obin v. District 9, International Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers, 487 F. Supp. 368
(E.D. Mo. 1980), afd inpart, rev'd in pa, and vacated inpart, 651 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1981);
Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324 (D. Vt. 1979); Isaacs v. Temple Univ., 467 F.
Supp. 67 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Keown v. Storti, 456 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aft'd, 601 F.2d 575
(3d Cir. 1979).
In certain circumstances, the defendant is the party who prevents unlawful practices and
thereby enforces congressional policy. When this occurs the restrictive Christlansburg defendant-
recovery rule is inapplicable, and some courts permit prevailing defendants to recover fees under
the prevailing plaintiff standards. See, eg., Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F.. Supp. 841 (E.D.
Mich. 1980). This interpretation finds some support in the legislative history of the Awards Act:
"In the large majority of cases the party or parties seeking to enforce such rights will be the
plaintiffs and/or plaintiff-intervenors. However, in the procedural posture of some cases, the par-
ties seeking to enforce such rights may be the defendants and/or defendant-intervenors." S. REP.
No. 1011, .sspra note 18, at 4 n.4, reprled in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912
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defend successfully against all of a plaintiff's claims. Once a court
reaches this relatively simple conclusion, it applies the prevailing-
defendant discretionary standards, focusing on the plaintiff's assertions
rather than on the defendant's conduct or offenses.'0 8  Defendant re-
coveries under the civil rights fee provisions have generally fallen into
four categories:' 0 9 (1) those in which plaintiffs simply lose on the mer-
its despite pressing claims that raise factual and legal issues warranting
resolution;"10 (2) those in which plaintiffs' causes of action have no
merit whatsoever when filed;'1 ' (3) those in which plaintiffs engage in
harassment, bad faith, or other misconduct;" 2 and (4) those in which a
baseless claim is combined with plaintiff misconduct.
' 3
Other practical problems may prevent either a prevailing plaintiff or
defendant from recovering otherwise available fees. The character of
the representation-public interest group legal assistance orpro se rep-
resentation-may pose barriers to relief.14 The procedural posture of
n.4. Thus, a "defendant-enforcer" class of prevailing defendants may obtain fee awards under the
liberal plaintiff award standards. See generally Malson, supra note 86, at 436-37.
108. Heinsz, supra note 11, at 268-74.
109. Id at 274.
110. See e.g., Ash v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 11 FEP Cas. 307 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Matyi v. Beer
Bottlers Local 1187, 392 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Mo. 1974). But see Isaacs v. Temple Univ., 467 F.
Supp. 67 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
111. See, e.g., EEOC v. First Ala. Bank, 595 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1979); Moss v. ITT Continen-
tal Baking Co., 468 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Va. 1979); Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 389 F. Supp. 84
(D. Md. 1975). But see Ohiand v. City of Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324 (D. Vt. 1979); EEOC v.
South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 12 FEP Cas. 1565 (D.S.C. 1976), rev'd, 562 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1977).
112. See, e.g., EEOC v. AAA, 12 FEP Cas. 995 (S.D. Fla. 1976); Robinson v. KMOX-TV, 407
F. Supp. 1272 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 397 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aJ'd,
535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976). But see Lujan v. New Mexico Health & Soc. Serv. Dept., 624 F.2d
968 (10th Cir. 1980).
113. See, ag., Reed v. Sisters of Charity, 447 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. La. 1978); Copeland v.
Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 1178 (D.D.C. 1977), aft'd, 603 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1044 (1980); Sek v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 421 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1976), af d, 565 F.2d
153 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 920 (1980).
114. Courts generally hold that public interest organizations, whether publicly or privately
funded, deserve fees on the same basis as private practitioners without limitation to the organiza-
tion's cost. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1980); Lackey v. Bowling, 476 F.
Supp. 111 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Some courts require that publicly-funded organizations advance im-
portant constitutional values for fee eligibility. See, e.g., Seattle School Dist. No. I v. Washington,
633 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1980). Courts also hold that the purposes of the civil rights fee
statutes-provision of fees to prevailing parties in order to give private citizens meaningful oppor-
tunity to vindicate their rights by securing competent counsel-do not include compensation of
pro se litigants who retain no professional assistance. See, e.g., Davis v. Parrat, 608 F.2d 717 (8th
Cir. 1979).
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the case can delay recovery or create additional attorney's fees.' 15 The
character of the opponent may, for instance, allow immunity defenses
to block a motion for fees. 16 Finally, a court, in its discretionary calcu-
115. Significant questions arise as to the point at which a party has prevailed for fee purposes.
The circuits have taken at least three positions in identifying when a district court's jurisdiction to
award fees expires. The First and Fourth Circuits treat fee claims as motions to alter or amend a
judgment that parties must file within 10 days after entry of judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e);
White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697, 699-700 (1st Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2313 (1981); Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 957-58 (4th Cir. 1975);
Hirschkop v. Snead, 475 F. Supp. 59, 62 (E.D. Va. 1979), aftd, 646 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1981). Cf.
Gary v. Spires, 634 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1980) (court applied Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) to find attorney's
fees were part of the costs). See also Reyes v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1230 (D. Minn. 1979);
Brown v. American Enka Corp., 452 F. Supp. 154, 159-60 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). The Fifth, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits, however, treat fees as an item of costs, which under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 54(d) and 58 are available after entry ofjudgment on the merits without a jurisdictional
time limitation. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d), 58; Johnson v. Snyder, 639 F.2d 316, 317 (6th Cir. 1981);
Jones v. Dealers Tractor & Equip. Co., 634 F.2d 180, 181-82 (5th Cir. 1981); Bond v. Stanton, 630
F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980); Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 496-97 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 2031 (1981); Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797-98 (5th Cir. 1980). The
Eighth Circuit recently adopted a hybrid position that avoids the conceptual problem of equating
costs and fees and also ameliorates the possible conflict of interest (see Mendoza v. United States,
623 F.2d 1338, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Prandini v. National Tea
Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977)) counsel could confront when forced to consider simulta-
neously the substantive issues and the amount of the fee award. Obin v. District 9, International
Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d 574, 584 (8th Cir. 1981). Treating a fee claim as a
matter collateral to and independent of the merits of the litigation, the court instructed the district
courts to adopt a uniform rule requiring that parties file fee claims within 21 days of judgment.
Id at 584. Seegenerally 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2679,
at 239 (1973); 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 54, at 1753. See also Note, Procedural
Characterization of Post-Judgment Requests for Attorney's Fees in Civil Rights Cases-Eliminating
Artificial Barriers to A4wards, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 827 (1981).
Furthermore, courts hold that fee awards should include time spent litigating the fee award,
e.g., Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729, 733 (10th Cir. 1981); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 792
(10th Cir. 1980); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411, 416 (3d Cir. 1979); Massachusetts Fair Share v.
O'Keefe, 476 F. Supp. 294, 300 (D. Mass. 1979), and collecting the judgment, e.g., Balark v. Cur-
tin, 655 F.2d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 1981).
116. Because Congress enacted the fee provisions of the civil rights statutes pursuant to its
plenary power to enforce the fourteenth amendment against the states, the eleventh amendment
and sovereign immunity do not stand as absolute bars to such awards. See Supreme Court of Va.
v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 737-39 (1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693 (1978);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-31 (1976); Hirschkop v. Snead, 646 F.2d 149, 151 (4th Cir.
1981); Knights of KKK v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 643 F.2d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir.
1981); Entertainment Concepts, Inc., III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 507 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 672 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1102 (1981); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 405 (5th Cir. 1980); Rheuark v. Shaw,
477 F. Supp. 897, 924-27 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aft'd in part and rev'd inpart, 628 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981). Governmental officers acting in their official capacities in
good faith are immune from personal liability but fees may be obtained from them in their official
capacities even in the absence of bad faith. Rheuark v. Shaw, 477 F. Supp. 897, 924-27 (N.D. Tex.
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lation of a reasonable fee, may increase or decrease liability for fees in




The potential for courts to abuse their discretion in shifting fees to
prevailing defendants is unfortunately great. Good faith litigants with
reasonable claims are often inadvertently punished. Courts should not
discourage plaintiffs proceeding upon the advice of competent counsel
from seeking vindication of their civil rights.1 8 Quite often the civil
rights litigant is poor or otherwise disadvantaged and, although unin-
formed, believes that another has discriminated against him." 9 A
1979), a.'d inpar and re'd in part, 628 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981 ).
Although the federal government is generally immune from fee awards, Congress is considering
expansion of federal liability in agency proceedings and court actions. One proposal, the "Equal
Access to Justice Act" (S. 265), imposes awards against the United States when it loses, unless the
government can show substantial justification for its position or that an award would be unjust.
See Award of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings Before the Subcomm on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-14 (1980).
117. Courts generally apply a 12-factor analysis, promulgated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), to calculate a reasonable fee. The analysis
examines: (1) time and labor required; (2) novelty and difficulty of the question presented;
(3) skill required to perform the legal services; (4) preclusion of other employment due to accept-
ance; (5) customary fee in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or circumstances of the case; (8) amount involved and results
obtained, (9) experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) undesirability of the case;
(11) nature and length of the professional relationship; and (12) awards in similar cases. See
generally Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1981); Higgins v. Okla. ex
rel. Okla. Employment Security Comm'n, 642 F.2d 1199 (10th Cir. 1981); David v. City of Abbe-
ville, 633 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1981); Entertainment Concepts, Inc., III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d
497 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); Neely v. City of Grenada, 624 F.2d 547 (5th
Cir. 1980); McManama v. Lukhard, 616 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1980); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d
Cir. 1979); Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 500 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Unemployed
Workers Organizing Comm. v. Batterton, 477 F. Supp. 509 (D. Md. 1979). See also ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1978). The Johnson factors are normally applied
after the court computes a "lodestar amount" (hours times billing rate), which is then adjusted up
or down at the court's discretion. Neely v. City of Granada, 624 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1980);
Anthony v. Marion County Gen. Hosp., 617 F.2d 1164, 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); Donnell v. General
Motors Corp., 500 F. Supp. 176, 179-80 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
118. Plaintiffs proceeding upon the advice of competent counsel should not be deterred from
seeking vindication of their civil rights. Silver v. KCA, 586 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1978); McCampbdl
v. Chrysler Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Burgess v. Hampton, 73 F.R.D. 540
(D.D.C. 1976); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), aft'd, 468
F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
119. E.g, McCampbell v. Chrysler Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1326, 1327 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
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party's good faith reliance on the advice of an attorney that such a
belief is sufficiently well-founded to warrant a lawsuit, however, does
not avoid liability for fee awards.120 In Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC12' the Supreme Court recognized this problem and directed the
district courts to avoid interjection of subjective views and hindsight
logic into prevailing defendant fee award determinations." Regretta-
bly, courts often forget the Christiansburg admonition.123
On the other hand, the deterrence of frivolous suits is also an impor-
tant policy objective for at least two reasons. First, complex, costly,
and lengthy civil rights suits can impose unreasonably on parties who
have not violated the law. Second, vital judicial resources otherwise
available to resolve legitimate disputes are wasted. 124 Furthermore,
unnecessary extension of judicial proceedings "breeds frustration with
the federal courts and, ultimately, disrespect for the law."'125 Currently,
however, statutory fee shifting and the bad faith exception to the Amer-
ican rule inappropriately accommodate these competing values.
A. Inadequacy of Common-Law Bad Faith
The standards for fee awards under the bad faith exception to the
American rule are stringent. 26  Unlike current statutory awards, the
120. When statutory fees to prevailing parties are available, a subtle conflict of interest may
arise between attorney and client with regard to the desirability of pursuing the claim by private
suit or in consideration of settlement proposals. See notes I 1 & 115 supra and accompanying text.
See also Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the.4ttorneys Fees Awards.4ct,
supra note 27.
121. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
122. [I]t is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage
in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail,
his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight
logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective
plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest one's belief that he has been
the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one's claim may appear at the
outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable. Decisive facts may not emerge until
discovery or trial. The law may change or clarify in the midst of litigation. Even when
the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have
an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.
Id at 421-22.
123. See notes 137-61 inlra and accompanying text.
124. See Hearings: Fees in Federal Court, supra note 10, at 22 (statement of Paul Nejelski).
125. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 757 n.4 (1980).
126. See Obin v. District 9, International Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers, 487 F. Supp.
368 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aj'd in part rev'd M part, and vacated inpart, 651 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1981);
Lipscomb v. Wise, 399 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Tex. 1975), rev'd, 551 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd,
437 U.S. 535 (1978).
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bad faith rule requires a demonstration of subjective bad faith. 127 The
rationale for bad faith fee awards is essentially punitive: to deter abu-
sive litigation generally and protect the integrity of the judicial pro-
cess.1 28 Furthermore, although civil rights statutory fee provisions do
not preempt bad faith awards,129 they do reduce their significance.
Most forms of bad faith conduct activate statutory fee awards.
Courts also award fees under the civil rights fee-shifting provisions
when plaintiffs engage in bad faith conduct. In Copeland v. Martinez130
the court awarded fees upon finding bad faith conduct in plaintiff's in-
tent to harass her supervisors in a Title VII dispute.13 1  Similarly, a
plaintiff seeking relitigation of a previously unsuccessful claim risks
statutory fee shifting.132 When a party forces litigation, with no objec-
tive factual 133 or legal 134 issues, courts properly shift fees. Obfuscation,
unreasonably enlarged complaints, and failure to follow procedural
guidelines or court orders may also lead to statutory fee shifting.' 5 In
short, there is considerable overlap between the statutory fee-shifting
provisions and the common-law bad faith exception to the American
rule. 136
127. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1977); Harris v. Plastics Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1980).
128. See Copeland v. Martinez, 603 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044
(1980).
129. Id
130. 435 F. Supp. 1178 (D.D.C. 1977), af'd, 603 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1044 (1980).
131. Id See also Bowers v. Kraft Foods Corp., 606 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1979); Haycraft v.
Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1979); Obin v. District 9, International Ass'n of Mach. &
Aerospace Workers, 487 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aj'd in part, rev'd in part, and vacated in
part, 651 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1981).
132. See, ag., Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980); Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d
128 (6th Cir. 1979); Matyi v. Beer Bottlers Local 1187, 392 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
133. See, ag., Farad v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1979); EEOC v. First
Ala. Bank, 595 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1979).
134. See, ag., LeGare v. University of Pa. Medical School, 488 F. Supp. 1250, 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1980); Goffv. Texas Instruments, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 973, 976 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
135. See, ag., Anthony v. Marion County Gen. Hosp., 617 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1980); Faraci v.
Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1979); Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 73 F.R.D.
411 (E.D. La. 1977), vacated, 599 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1979), afdsub nom. Roadway Express, Inc,
v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Robinson v. KMOX-TV, 407 F. Supp. 1272 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Matyi
v. Beer Bottlers Local 1187, 392 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Mo. 1974). But see Merritt v. International
Bhd. of Boilermakers, 495 F. Supp. 17, 24 (N.D. Miss. 1979).
136. See Merritt v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 495 F. Supp. 17, 24-25 (N.D. Miss.
1979).
One other aspect of the bad faith concept merits further attention. After Roadway, it is clear
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B. Judicial Misconstruction of Statutory Defendant Awards
Overzealous application of the prevailing defendant standard in civil
rights cases thwarts the overriding congressional objective to encourage
vigorous enforcement by private parties of favored civil rights laws.
Claims that raise factual or legal issues but nevertheless fall into the
gray area between frivolousness and reasonableness present the most
difficult cases for balancing the enforcement and deterrence policies.
An examination of several recent cases illustrates the uncertainty that
potential litigants face when evaluating the merits of a case and the
likelihood of an adverse fee award. In the absence of bad faith con-
duct, courts often act capriciously. Thus, courts are less likely to award
attorney's fees to a defendant when the plaintiff presents a jury submis-
sible case but loses137 than in a case in which the plaintiff presents no
evidence at all.138 This is not an inflexible rule, however, and peculiar
circumstances may influence courts to deny fee awards when they
would otherwise appear to be proper.
In Bowers v. Kraft Foods Corp. 13' a black employee alleged that ra-
cial motivations prompted her dismissal. The district court ruled that
evidence of her unsatisfactory work performance, attitude, and em-
ployment record justified the employer's action. It based its award of
fees to the prevailing employer-defendant on its conclusion that Bowers
had "no foundation in fact for her lawsuit and. . . this is a frivolous
lawsuit maliciously filed."' 4I The Eighth Circuit vacated the fee award
for two reasons. First, plaintiff received a right to sue letter from the
that attorneys who engage in bad faith conduct risk personal liability for excess expenses created
by their conduct. The civil rights fee provisions do not offer courts that option. See notes 51-54
supra and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Wooten v. Clifton Forge School Bd., 655 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1981); Gresham
Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1981); Anthony v. Marion County Gen.
Hosp., 617 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1980); Mosby v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1977);
Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1975); Merritt v. International Bhd. of
Boilermakers, 495 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. Miss. 1979); Bennett v. Cramer, 495 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Wis.
1980); Isaacs v. Temple Univ., 467 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467
F. Supp. 324 (D. Vt. 1979); Keown v. Storti, 456 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1978), afd, 601 F.2d 575
(4th Cir. 1979); Milburn v. Girard, 455 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Pa. 1978). But see Prochaska v. Mar-
coux, 632 F.2d 848 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2316 (1981).
138. See, eg., Harbulak v. County of Suffolk, 654 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Terminal Transp. Co., 653 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1981); Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d
1272 (5th Cir. 1981); Haywood v. Ball, 634 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1980).
139. 606 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1979).
140. Bowers v. Kraft Foods Corp., 467 F. Supp. 971, 974 (E.D. Mo.), afl'd in part and rev'd in
part, 606 F.2d 816 (8th Ci. 1979).
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EEOC that reasonably could have led her to believe in the merit of her
claim. 41 Second, the court held that although the evidence was weak,
it conceivably was sufficient to convince a lay person that a stronger
case existed.' 42 Other courts have similarly vacated fee awards to pre-
vailing defendants when the plaintiff could not reasonably foresee the
unreasonableness of the action 43 before trial or when other peculiar
facts' 4 hampered plaintiffs efforts to evaluate the merits fully before
filing suit.
Similarly, in Reed v. Famous Barr Division,'14 a district court deter-
mined that an employer's dismissal of a male employee was not based
on his sex. The record disclosed ample business justification for the
dismissal and other evidence discrediting his assertion of discrimina-
tion. Nevertheless, the court, in deference to the "chilling and repres-
sive" "precedential impact" of prevailing defendant fee awards, denied
defendant's fee motion.' 46 The court refused to emphasize the poor
judgment, anger, and subjective motivations of the plaintiff in filing
suit in favor of a "totality of the circumstances" test.147
By contrast, in Prochaska v. Marcoux148 and Fantroy v. Greater St
Louis Labor Council149 courts compelled civil rights plaintiffs to pay
their opponent's fees after they raised submissible questions under the
civil rights acts but lost on the merits.
Prochaska initiated a civil rights action for deprivation of constitu-
tional rights stemming from his arrest and conviction under Colorado's
boating safety laws.' 50 He alleged that the arresting officer lacked
probable cause to suspect invalid registration and acted "in utter and
callous disregard of [his] rights" in searching the boat for fishing
141. 606 F.2d at 818.
142. Id
143. See, eg., Smith v. Josten's Am. Yearbook Co., 624 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1980); Olitsky v.
O'Malley, 597 F.2d 303 (1st Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Chandelle Club, 506 F. Supp. 75 (W.D. Okla.
1980).
144. See, e.g., Luna v. International Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers Local 36, 614 F.2d
529 (5th Cir. 1980); Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324 (D. Vt. 1979); McCampbell v.
Chrysler Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F.
Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), a'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
145. 518 F. Supp. 538 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
146. Id at 543.
147. Id
148. 632 F.2d 848 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2316 (1981).
149. 511 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (motion for attorney's fees granted); Fantroy v. Greater
St. Louis Labor Council, 478 F. Supp. 355 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (order denying summary judgment).
150. Prochaska sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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licenses and boat safety gear. 51 The registration proved valid, and the
court dismissed the citation. In Prochaska's subsequent civil rights suit
the trial court found the action was not frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation and denied the defendant's motion for attorney's
fees.' 52 Unrestrained by the usual scope of review in statutory fee
awards, 153 the appellate court granted defendant's cross-appeal for fees
under the Awards Act and held that as a matter of law plaintiffs suit
squarely fit the Christiansburg criteria.
In Fantroy, plaintiffs filed a complaint1 4 "alleging a widespread con-
spiracy to thwart plaintiffs' efforts" to secure a referendum to pass a
controversial "Right-to-Work" amendment in Missouri.'55 On mo-
tions for summary judgment the district court ruled that plaintiffs had
alleged a cause of action for conspiracy to discriminate against mem-
bers of a political group. 156 Although the court indicated that plaintiffs
produced evidence during discovery that linked defendants with the
allegations in the complaint, 57 it also questioned whether plaintiffs
could establish the conspiracy, stressing the existence of factual
issues. 158
The jury resolved the conspiracy issue against plaintiffs. The court
then granted defendants' motions for fees even though "plaintiffs ar-
151. 632 F.2d at 854.
152. Id at 853.
153. Some confusion exists as to the appropriate standard of review. Some circuit courts ap-
ply the clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g, Prochaska v. Marcoux, 632 F.2d 848, 853 (10th Cir.
1980) (Doyle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2316 (1981).
Others apply an abuse of discretion standard. See, eg., Wooten v. Clifton Forge School Bd., 655
F.2d 552, 556 (4th Cir. 1981); Harbulak v. County of Suffolk, 654 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 1981).
The Fifth Circuit apparently employs both. Compare Coen v. Harrison County School Bd., 638
F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1981) (clearly erroneous) with Ellwest Stereo Theatre, Inc. v. Jackson, 653
F.2d 954, 955 (5th Cir. 1981) (abuse of discretion). Under either standard, appellate courts should
substantially defer to the district court's sound discretion to award or deny attorney's fees. See
Obin v. District 9, International Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d 574,586 (8th Cir.
1981); Cronin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 588 F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1978).
154. The original complaint attempted to state causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982,
1985(3) (1976). The district court dismissed the claims under §§ 1981 and 1982 for failure to state
a cause of action under sections proscribing denial of equal protection of laws and discrimination
in property transactions. Fantroy v. Greater St. Louis Labor Council, 478 F. Supp. 355, 357 (E.D.
Mo. 1979).
155. 478 F. Supp. at 356.
156. 478 F. Supp. at 357. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976).
157. 478 F. Supp. at 356-57.
158. Id at 357. The court stated: "Whether or not plaintiffs will eventually be able to prove
the widespread conspiracy which they allege is unclear at this time. It is apparent, though, that
there are issues of fact remaining as to these defendants' involvement." Id
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guably established a civil rights precedent-that political petitioners
constitute a protected class under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)." 159 On similar
facts, other courts have denied prevailing defendant's motions for fees
under the civil rights fee-shifting provisions. 160 Plaintiffs later dropped
all substantive claims in return for defendants' offer to waive the fee
award.1 61
When plaintiffs raise no material or admissible evidence, the likeli-
hood of fee awards to defendants increases. In Church of Scientology v.
Cazares,162 a church organization sued the mayor of Clearwater, Flor-
ida, on defamation and civil rights grounds.163 The church alleged that
the mayor engaged in a course of conduct designed to deter its free
exercise of religion and ostracize the church from the community. The
Fifth Circuit sustained the mayor's summary judgment motion because
no material issues of fact existed. 1" The court granted defendant's mo-
159. Fantroy v. Greater St. Louis Labor Council, 511 F. Supp. 70, 72 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
160. Cf. Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1981) (issues not
so clear-cut as to render plaintiff's constitutional claim frivolous); Anthony v. Marion County
Gen. Hosp., 617 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs mere failure to prosecute, which resulted in
dismissal, insufficient to establish frivolity or vexatiousness); Bowers v. Kraft Foods Corp., 606
F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1979) (weak evidence from litigants' perspective; issue reached jury); Bennett v.
Cramer, 495 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (plaintiff failed to show a causal connection between
injury and defendant's act; submissible jury issue for nominal damages on constitutional rights
deprivation made fee award improper); Merritt v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 495 F.
Supp. 17 (N.D. Miss. 1979) (insufficient evidentiary facts to sustain allegations; plethora of mo-
tions extending length of litigation); Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324 (D. Vt. 1979)
(extended discussion of legal issues evidences fact that suit not groundless, vexatious, frivolous, or
unreasonable); Burgess v. Hampton, 73 F.R.D. 540 (D.D.C. 1976) (although evidence did not bear
out allegation plaintiff suspected discrimination; pursued claim in good faith in reasonable man-
ner). But see Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, 648 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court erred in deny-
ing fee award on basis of plaintiffs good faith and novelty of claim); Church of Scientology v.
Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981) (extended consideration of legal issues, existence of some
evidence, novelty of legal issues insufficient to avoid frivolity).
161. An agreement between the parties enabled the plaintiff, who earned $250 a week, to es-
cape liability for a fee award of $100,582 plus interest. After agreeing to drop appeals from the
verdict the plaintiff likened the settlement to blackmail: "I had no choice. I was faced with pay-
ing the other side's attorneys' fees. It became a matter of money instead of principle. I still be-
lieve in the lawsuit." St. Louis Globe-Democrat, June 12, 1981, at 12A, col. 2.
162. 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981).
163. Count I alleged a § 1983 violation, contending that the mayor, under color of state law,
deprived the Church of its first amendment freedom of religious privileges. Count II alleged state
law defamation under the federal court's diversity jurisdiction. Id at 1275.
164. The district court did not pass on the existence of factual issues, but dismissed the
Church's complaint for lack of standing to sue. Id at 1281. The court of appeals then affirmed
summary judgment on its conclusion that no material issues of fact existed with respect to the civil
rights claim. Id at 1284.
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tion for attorney's fees despite the viability of the church's complaint
for over two years and the district court's explicit recognition that the
case presented novel legal issues.16 5
In Anthony v. Marion County General Hospital,166 however, the Fifth
Circuit vacated a prevailing defendant fee award imposed after the dis-
trict court dismissed plaintiff's claim for failure to prosecute.1 67 The
district court found a failure to prosecute because the plaintiff repeat-
edly filed for continuances to prepare responses to defendant's sum-
mary judgment motions, failed to obtain new counsel after an attorney
withdrew, refused to acknowledge receipt of various notices by mail,
and finally, failed to appear at two dismissal hearings. The circuit
court held that fee shifting was inappropriate because the court could
not characterize the plaintiff's actions as frivolous or vexatious without
hearing the merits. It did not consider the unreasonableness of this
conduct sufficient to support an award.1 68
Thus, in similar fact situations, some courts grant and some courts
deny prevailing defendants' motions for fees under the civil rights fee-
shifting provisions.' 69 These cases illustrate the difficulty prospective
civil rights plaintiffs encounter in gauging the risk of adverse fee
awards, as the award often depends on the trial court'spost hoe subjec-
tive view of the merits. Seemingly irreconcilable federal decisions com-
pound the problem.17 0 Moreover, effective appellate review is often
difficult because of the deferential abuse of discretion standard. Re-
view is particularly difficult when district courts cryptically address fee
motions in their opinions.' 71 Increased uniformity is essential.
165. Id at 1290.
166. 617 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1980).
167. Id at 1170.
168. The court remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the circumstances
warranted a fee award. Id
169. See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
170. Compare Reed v. Famous Barr Div., 518 F. Supp. 538 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (weak factual
issues raised, subjective motivations for suit downplayed-no fee award to prevailing defendant)
with Fantroy v. Greater St. Louis Labor Council, 511 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (factual issues
raised, but court concluded claim was meritless because plaintiffs continued to litigate after plain-
tiffs and the court dismissed most defendants-fee award to prevailing defendants); and compare
Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981) (court granted summary judg-
ment and assessed fees without explicit findings of fact by district court) with Anthony v. Marion
County Gen. Hosp., 617 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1980) (court remanded issue of fee award appropri-
ateness to district court because it could not consider claim frivolous for mere failure to
prosecute).
171. See, e.g., Middleton v. Remington Arms Co., 594 F.2d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1979). The
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C. 41ternative Devices to Discourage Frivolous Suits
Fee shifting is not the only means of deterring frivolous suits by
plaintiffs. Frivolous litigation is by no means confined to the civil
rights context, and other areas of law have developed different solu-
tions. Before considering legislative methods to improve fee-shifting
deterrence it is useful to examine some of these alternatives.
1. Internal Remedie' 72
a. Procedural Restraints on Frivolous Suits
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide courts with effective
measures to weed out frivolous or gioundless suits. For instance, Rule
37 allows a court to tax attorney's fees to a party not cooperating with
discovery procedures, 173 Rule 41 allows discretionary fee awards
court denied the prevailing defendant's claim for fees without any objective analysis whatsoever.
The court stated cursorily:
Remington Arms requests. . . attorney's fees. . . on the basis that Middleton prose-
cuted this appeal after he should have known that his claims were frivolous. Although
we have upheld the judgment of the District Court, we do not believe that Middleton's
contentions on appeal were so frivolous as to justify an award of attorney's fees to Rem-
ington Arms.
Id at 1213 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). For precedential value and consistency, courts
should issue findings of fact and conclusions of law justifying grants or denials of all fee requests.
See generally Cohn v. Papke, 655 F.2d 191, 195 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981); Collins v. Chandler Unified
School Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1981); Murphy v. Kolovitz, 635 F.2d 662, 663 (7th Cir.
1981); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. dented, 444
U.S. 1046 (1980).
172. Internal remedies are those that parties or courts may invoke during a lawsuit itself.
173. Rule 37 fee shifting under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the primary deterrent
to "frivolous requests for or objections to discovery." Advisory Comm. Note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 540
(1970). A substantial justification standard is provided to govern courts' determinations of
whether a motion, or opposition to a motion, is genuine. See generally 8 C. WRIoHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 115, § 2288, at 786, 790; Note, Proposed 1967Amendment to the Federal.Dls-
covery Rules, 68 COLuM. L. Rav. 271, 292 (1968).
The sanctions available to courts for regulating discovery are varied and flexible. A district
court has broad discretion to treat "failure to comply with a discovery order as contempt of court,
require payment of reasonable attorneyrs] fees, stay the action until [compliance is forthcoming],
require admissions, allow designated evidence, strike pleadings, or enter a dismissal or a default
judgment." Kropp v. Ziebarth, 557 F.2d 142, 146 (8th Cir. 1977). See In re Professional Hockey
Antitrust Litigation, 531 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir.), rev'don other grounds, 427 U.S. 639 (1976). The rule
also allows assessment of expenses, including attorney's fees, against an attorney advising a party
as well as against party who fails to comply. See Ogletree v. Keebler Co., 78 F.R.D. 661 (N.D.
Ga. 1978); Palma v. Lake Waukomis Dev. Co., 48 F.R.D. 366 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address the issue of attorney's fees. Rule 37 provides
attorney's fees and expenses against parties or attorneys who force their opponents to move for
orders compelling discovery (Rule 37(a)(4)); against parties or attorneys who fail to comply with
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against parties seeking a second dismissal of complaints, 74 and Rule 38
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure awards fees against an
appellant who conducts a frivolous appeal. These provisions partially
codify the bad faith rule.'75 Other rules that do not provide for recov-
ery of attorney's fees but nevertheless promote veracity and reasonable-
ness in complaints include the requirements for signed pleadings 176 and
rules governing dismissal.' 77 Rule 54(d) permits discretionary judicial
assessment of costs not including attorney's fees.'78
Section 1927 of Title 28 now penalizes attorneys for unreasonable
and vexatious conduct that multiplies proceedings and increases costs
unnecessarily. 179 Prior to Roadway Express, Inc. v. PIier,180 the circuits
disputed the viability of section 1927 as a basis for imposing attorney's
discovery orders (Rule 37(b)(2)); against parties who fail to admit matters requested under Rule
36 (Rule 37(c)); and against parties or attorneys who fail to attend their own depositions, serve
answers to interrogatories, or respond to requests for inspection (Rule 37(d)). FED. I CIV. P.
37(a)-(d). See United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1980)
(Rule 37(b)(2)); Weigel v. Shapiro, 608 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1979) (Rule 37(b)(2), (d)); Admiral
Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1978) (Rule 37(b)(2)); Marquis v.
Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1978) (Rule 37(a)(4)). See generally Roadway Express, Inc.
v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Browne, Civil Rule 11: The Signature and Signature Block, 9 CAP.
UL. REv. 291 (1979); Risinger, supra note 20.
174. Involuntary dismissal imposed by courts sua sponte or on motions to dismiss is an ex-
traordinary remedy requiring a clear record of bad faith, abuse of process, or complete lack of
factual support for claims alleged. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b), (d). See Anthony v. Marion County
Gen. Hosp., 617 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1980); Olitsky v. O'Malley, 597 F.2d 303 (Ist Cir. 1979);
Windsor v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 523 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1975); Carter v. United States, 83 F.R.D.
116 (ED. Mo. 1979).
175. FED. R. App. P. 38 (just damages or double costs).
176. Rule 11 places a responsibility on attorneys before signing their names on complaints to
ascertain that a reasonable basis exists for the allegations of jurisdiction and the relief requested.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See Delgado v. de Jesus, 440 F. Supp. 979 (D.P.R. 1976). Lawyers must
investigate to ascertain that a reasonable basis exists, even if allegations are made on information
or belief. See Helfant v. Louisiana & S. Life Ins. Co., 82 F.R.D. 53 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Miller v.
Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The rule provides that the attorney may be
subject to appropriate disciplinary action when a violation occurs. It does not, however, provide
authority for awarding fees against unsuccessful litigants. See United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
603 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1979). But see Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980)
(assuming fees appropriate under Rule I 1 if bad faith conduct present); LeGare v. University of
Pa. Medical School, 488 F. Supp. 1250, 1257 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (inherent disciplinary power of
trial court).
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (motion for judgment on the pleadings); id 41(b) (involuntary
dismissal); id 50(a) (motion for directed verdict); id 56 (summary judgment).
178. Id. 54(d). See Delta Airlines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981).
179, See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
180. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
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fees.'"' InRoadway the Supreme Court resolved the issue by excluding
attorney's fees from the "costs" that courts may award under the sec-
tion. Thereafter, Congress amended section 1927 expressly to permit
taxation of "excess costs, expenses, and attorney's fees" caused by dila-
tory conduct.' 8 2 Thus, a federal court may require an offending attor-
ney to indemnify an opponent for unreasonable conduct under section
1927 or under the judiciary's inherent power to administer its affairs
efficiently.
b. The Contempt Power
Extreme and willful obstructive or disruptive conduct by an attorney
or a litigant may warrant exercise of a court's inherent contempt pow-
ers. Since 1789 federal statutes1 83 have authorized contempt citations
to maintain order in judicial proceedings and promote the fair adminis-
tration of justice.'8 4 Because of its drastic nature and stringent mens
rea requirements,' 85 contempt is of limited value in discouraging frivo-
lous suits. An attorney, to engage in contemptuous conduct, must will-
fully disregard or disobey a court's authority. Moreover, a separate
181. Some courts interpreted § 1927 to embrace attorney's fees. See, e.g., Browning Deben-
ture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1089 (2d Cir. 1977); Meitzner v. Mindick,
549 F.2d 775, 784 (C.C.P.A.) (dictum), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 (1977); Harrell v. Joffrion, 73
F.R.D. 267, 268 (W.D. La.), af'dmet, 545 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1976). Others limited § 1927 to
traditional costs, which do not include attorney's fees. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 535 F.2d
346 (6th Cir. 1976); 1507 Corp. v. Henderson, 447 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1971); Chrysler Corp. v.
Lakeshore Commercial Fin. Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1216 (E.D. Wis. 1975), a'dmen, 549 F.2d 804
(7th Cir. 1977). See generally 60 B.U.L. REv. 950, 952-53 (1980).
182. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
183. The Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized federal courts "to punish.. by fine or imprison-
ment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before
same." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83. Currently, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) provides:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its
discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure establish summary contempt disposition if the conduct
constituting contempt occurs in a court's presence. FED. R. CanM. P. 42(a). If the conduct occurs
without the court's presence the contemner is entitled to notice and a hearing. Id. 42(b).
184. See generally Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873); R. GOLDFARB, THE CON-
TEM T POWER (1963); Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Mho Abuse the Judicial
Process, 44 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 619 (1977); 64 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 300 (1973).
185. See Sykes v. United States, 444 F.2d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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trial is necessary to punish the contemner, unless the conduct occurs in
the court's presence.' 86
Courts should employ internal procedural sanctions vigorously to in-
hibit groundless litigation and prevent avoidable expense. Some proce-
dural sanctions also offer the added advantage of penalizing the
attorney, rather than the good-faith litigant, for unjustifiably forward-
ing claims and abusing judicial processes. 87 The primary objective of
private enforcement of the civil rights laws provided by Congress is
better served by mechanisms that avoid intimidating good-faith plain-
tiffs. Nevertheless, these measures all require bad faith or intentional
misconduct-unsatisfactory elements for a deterrence scheme in the
civil rights context.
2. External Remedies 88
a. Wrongful Civil Process/Abuse of Process18 9
The wrongful civil process tort balances the same conflicting policies
that complicate the tension between prevailing plaintiff and prevailing
defendant fee awards: free access to judicial relief unfettered by retali-
atory actions and the adverse effects of groundless, frivolous, coercive,
or harassing lawsuits."9 From the inception of the tort, however,
courts have carefully safeguarded the free access policy. 191 The major-
ity rule requires that the plaintiff establish favorable resolution of a
prior suit that the defendant maliciously instituted without reasonable
186. See note 183 .supra.
187. See notes 173, 176 & 179-83 supra and accompanying text.
188. External remedies require separate proceedings to remedy damages caused by groundless
litigation or deter future instances of misconduct. Internal remedies are obviously preferable
because they avoid needless duplication of proofs, the additional costs imposed on the litigant,
and, in some cases, court congestion.
189. Wrongful civil proceedings and malicious prosecution are often employed interchangea-
bly to refer to the same tort in civil actions. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 120, at 853 (4th ed. 1971); REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977).
190. Mallen, An Attorney's Liabilityfor Malicious Prosecution, A Misunderstood Tort, 46 INS.
COuNsEL J. 407, 409 (1979). See also Note, Liabilityfor Proceeding with UnfoundedLitigation, 33
VAND. L. REv. 743 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Unfounded Litigation]; Note, A Lawyer'
Duty to Reject Groundless Litigation, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1561 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Groundless Litigation]; Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A His-
torical Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Malicious Prosecution
Debate].
191. W. PROSSER, supra note 189, § 120, at 850-53 (collecting cases); Note, Groundless Litra-
tion, supra note 190, at 1564.
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and probable cause.192 The minority, or English rule, includes an addi-
tional special damages element. 93
The abuse of process and wrongful civil proceedings torts are related
but concentrate on different aspects of the frivolous suit problem. 194
The wrongful civil proceedings tort presupposes a meritless action, ini-
tiated without foundation. Abuse of process, by contrast, punishes par-
ties who commence a justifiable action to attain improper collateral
objectives. 195  The complaining party, however, must demonstrate an
ulterior motive and a definite act or threat in addition to the justifiable
action. 196
Both torts exhibit characteristics that reduce their effectiveness as de-
terrents of frivolous suits. The most significant drawbacks are immu-
nity defenses available to attorneys. In wrongful civil proceedings
suits, attorneys are immune if they act without knowledge of their cli-
ents' wrongful purposes. 197 No general immunity exists for attorneys in
abuse of process cases, but courts have held attorneys liable only for
egregious misconduct. 19  Moreover, establishing malice in wrongful
civil process cases is particularly difficult. 199 Several courts have in-
ferred probable cause if an attorney has advised the defendant to
192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674, Comment e (1977); Note, UnfoundedLit-
gation, supra note 190, at 1564; Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 190, at 746; Note, Malicious
Prosecution Debate, supra note 190, at 1219-20.
193. Note, UnfoundedLitigation, supra note 190, at 746. See also Note, Groundless Litigatlon,
supra note 190, at 1565. Compensatory damages under either rule include all expenses and dam-
age incurred by reason of the wrongful litigation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 681
(1977).
194. See W. PROssER, srupra note 189, § 121, at 856-57; Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note
190, at 1565.
195. W. PROSSER, supra note 189, § 121, at 856; Note, UnfoundedLitgatlon, supra note 190, at
751; Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 190, at 1565.
196. W. PROSSER, supra note 189, § 121, at 857.
197. Mallen, supra note 190, at 409; Note, supra note 184, at 637.
198. Note, supra note 184, at 638-39. The distinction between the potential liability of attor-
neys in wrongful civil proceedings cases and abuse of process cases is justifiable. The tort of
wrongful civil proceedings attacks frivolous litigation. Few attorneys would press novel issues,
litigate difficult issues, or challenge the propriety of existing legal doctrine if threatened by retalia-
tory wrongful civil proceedings suits. Mallen, supra note 190, at 409. Abuse of process, by con-
trast, focuses on misapplication ofjudicial processes. Because probable cause for suit is irrelevant,
it is more likely that the attorney has collaborated in the abusive course of action.
199. See W. PROSSER, supra note 187, § 120, at 855; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 675, 676 (1977); Note, UnfoundedLitigatlon, supra note 190, at 747-48. To establish the malice
of an attorney at common law a party had to prove the attorney's knowledge of the lack of proba-
ble cause for the action, and an improper motive by the attorney or the attorney's knowledge of
the client's malice. Mallen, supra note 190, at 418.
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sue.2oc Special damages requirements also hinder recovery.
b. Bar Disciplinary Proceedings
Few courts have considered the role of the attorney in discouraging
groundless suits in the civil rights context. Those courts that have ad-
dressed the issue focus more on the inability of the client to ascertain
the legal validity of his claim than on the attorney's failure to apprise
the client of the potential liabilities of filing suit.2 0 1 Heightened aware-
ness of the problem and internal enforcement measures within the pro-
fession could serve as a useful adjunct in further deterring groundless
suits.
The ethical foundation for such an approach arises from considera-
tion of Canon 7: "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously
Within the Bounds of the Law."2 2 Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-102(A)(1)
subjects an attorney to disciplinary action °' "when he knows or when
it is obvious" that commencing suit only "harass[es] or maliciously in-
jure[s] another."204 DR7-102(A)(2) prohibits advancement of a claim
with knowledge that it is unwarranted by law, if no good faith argu-
ment for extending, modifying, or reversing current law exists. 20 5 Af-
firmative duties of disclosure206 and proper representation20 7 bear on
decisions to commence suit and the methods by which the suit is con-
200. Most courts, however, apply an objective standard to measure the probable cause ele-
ment. Mallen, supra note 190, at 415; Note, Ufowunded Litigation, supra note 190, at 747.
201. See, e.g., LeGare v. University of Pa. Medical School, 488 F. Supp. 1250, 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1980). "Certainly a civil rights plaintiff should not lightly be penalized for her lawyer's.., er-
rors." Id. See note 138 smupra and accompanying text.
202. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 7 (emphasis added).
203. Generally, a court or bar association that has the power to admit an attorney to practice
law in a jurisdiction has the power to disbar, suspend, censure, or reprimand publicly or privately
an attorney. Any interested person can initiate disciplinary proceedings. The ABA Code itself,
however, does not provide for procedures or penalties:
The Code makes no attempt to prescribe either disciplinary procedures or penalties for
violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to define standards for civil liabil-
ity of lawyers for professional conduct. The severity of judgment against one found
guilty of violating a Disciplinary Rule should be determined by the character of the
offense and the attendant circumstances.
Pelimixary Statement, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1978) [hereinafter cited as
ABA CODE].
204. ABA CODE, upra note 203, DR7-102(A)(1).
205. Id DR7-102(AX2).
206. See Id DR7-102(A)(l)-(3), -(7); EC 7-5, 7-8.
207. See Id DR7-106(c)(1); EC 7-4, 7-9, 7-25, 7-39.
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ducted.208 The client, of course, retains the ultimate power to decide
whether to undertake an action. This decision, however, is largely de-
pendent on competent legal advice based on all facts known to counsel.
Bar discipline, however, only symbolically compensates the victim of
frivolous litigation.209 Furthermore, the current code requires actual
attorney knowledge of clients' improper motives, 210 without consider-
ing the degree of care the attorney used to evaluate the merits of the
case.211 Moreover, legitimate criticisms of the profession's record as a
self-disciplining entity indicate that bar proceedings inadequately regu-
late professional abuses. 212
IV. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL
The competing values of encouraging private enforcement of civil
rights laws and discouraging frivolous litigation through prevailing
party fee awards are not easily accommodated. The statutory provi-
sions governing awards to defendants, moreover, do not balance these
interests fairly. Good faith litigants who press factual and legal issues
for judicial resolution are often punished under current prevailing de-
fendant statutory award standards. Regrettably, courts and attorneys
208. The attorney's duty to withdraw from a frivolous action is uncertain at best. When a
claim is not warranted under current law and no good faith modification or extension arguments
exist, DR2-110(C) allows, but does not mandate, withdrawal. An attorney, however, must with-
draw if he "knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a
Disciplinary Rule." ABA CODE, supra note 203, DR2- 10(B). Because a lawyer violates DR7-
102(A)(2) when he knowingly advances unwarranted claims, arguably the Code requires with-
drawal for this violation. See Cann, Frivolous Lawsuits-The Lawyer' Duty to Say '"o'; 52
COLO. L. REv. 367, 377 n.51 (1981).
209. There is no financial inducement to file a complaint with a bar agency. See note 203
suara.
210. See notes 203-05 supra and accompanying text.
211. The proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct remove the restrictive knowledge
standard and provide an objective measure of the attorney's conduct. Section (b) of Rule 3.3
states that "a lawyer shall bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
only when a lawyer acting in good faith would conclude that there is a reasonable basis for doing
so." ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.3(b), at 71 (Discussion Draft 1980). A
"reasonable basis for doing so" is defined in the accompanying comments with an objective "sub-
stantial basis" standard. Id. at 72.
212. See, ag., ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970) (Clark Committee),
reprinted in A. KAUFmAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 515-22 (1976); S. TISHER,
L. BERNABEI & M. GREEN, BRINOINO THE BAR TO JUSTICE: A STUDY OF Six BAR ASSOCIATIONS
86 (1977); Marks & Cathcart, Diseiollne Within the Legal Frofession: Is it Self-Regulatlon, 1974 U.
ILL. L.F. 193; Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients andProfessionalReulaton, 1976 AM. B. FOUN-
DATION RESEARCH J. 917.
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are often in a position to avoid needless pain and expense to the litigant
but fail to do so.23 Furthermore, inconsistency abounds in the applica-
tion of the standards, which denies potential plaintiffs the opportunity
to assess accurately the likelihood that a court will impose a fee award.
In addition, judicially created exceptions to the American rule214 and
traditional alternatives to deter frivolous suits215 do not adequately
protect against the threat of spurious litigation-especially in the civil
rights context in which the statutory and practical incentives to litigate
are great.216
Commentators have suggested sweeping alteration of the breadth of
fee shifting; these modified omnibus proposals countenance discretion-
ary fee awards in public interest litigation whenever the interests of
justice so require.217 Some would alter the traditional presumption of
213. In Fantroy, for instance, the district court had repeated opportunities to dismiss the cause
upon defendants' motions but instead it allowed the case to proceed through the jury's delibera-
tions before deciding that plaintiff's pursuit of relief was unreasonable. Fantroy v. Greater St.
Louis Labor Council, 511 F. Supp. 70, 72 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
214. See notes 39-70 supra and accompanying text.
215. See notes 172-212 supra and accompanying text. Commentators have urged adoption of
several nontraditional alternatives. Criticizing the reliance on duplicative litigation in wrongful
civil proceedings and abuse of process cases, some urge adoption of a compulsory counterclaim
for groundless suits. A counterclaimant would have to prove that the opposing party sued without
probable cause under a reasonableness standard; the proofs coinciding with the merits in the ac-
tion. See Note, Unfounded Litigation, supra note 190, at 752-53; Note, Malicious Prosecution De-
bate, supra note 190, at 1232-35.
Others propose creation of duties running from an attorney to his adversary, by permitting the
adversary to sue for legal malpractice if damaged by frivolous litigation. See Note, Groundless
Litigation, supra note 190, at 1570-87. To date, no American jurisdiction has recognized a litigat-
ing attorney's duty to his client's adversary or otherwise held the attorney liable to that party for
negligence. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 325 (1977 & Supp. 1980); Cann,
supra note 208, at 375. Other professionals are subject to such malpractice duties. See, e.g.,
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (accountant); Tarasoff v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 CaL Rptr. 14 (1976) (psychiatrist owes duty to
victim of client's attack); Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (banker controlling development owes duty to purchasers). See generally
Note, Public Accountants andAttorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW.
588 (1972).
216. The statutory incentive arises from the prevailing plaintiff standard that liberally distrib-
utes fees to litigants who prevail on at least one issue or compel voluntary compliance with civil
rights laws. See notes 94-96 & 103-06 supra and accompanying text. The practical incentive exists
because the plaintiff may have nothing to lose due to his economic status. A fee award from a
judgment-proof plaintiff is of little value to the prevailing defendant.
217. Public interest groups lobby for adoption of a "public interest" exception to the American
rule that is essentially a codification of the "private attorneys general" exception. The Council for
Public Interest Law urged a congressional subcommittee to:
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the American rule and award fees to the prevailing litigant unless the
loser acted with substantial justification or the interests of justice and
free access to the courts required otherwise.218 Others suggest deter-
rence of frivolous suits by legislatively synthesizing fee awards and al-
ternative methods in a uniform statutory approach.219  These radical
reforms, however, are not justified.
The problem of prevailing defendant fee awards requires legislative
adjustment at a different analytical level. Inconsistency and subjectiv-
ity are the chief failures of the current standard. A congressional revi-
sion that narrows courts' discretion to award fees to defendants would
enhance the likelihood of objective and consistent results. This, in
turn, would promte the strength of the private enforcement policy and
restrain frivolous suits at a level appropriately addressing the need for
deterrence of spurious claims. Good faith assertions that merely fail
before the jury are not an example of spurious litigation. Moreover, fee
awards imposed on litigants presenting jury submissible claims thwart
the congressional objective of private enforcement. 20
Congress should pass a generic measure, tailored to further the spe-
(1) pass legislation that would permit federal courts, in any civil action arising under a
statute of the United States or the Constitution, in the interest ofjustice, to allow reason-
able attorney fees and other costs of litigation to a party who substantially prevails if the
court determines that (a) the action results in a substantial public benefit; and (b)(1) the
economic interest of the party is small in comparison to the costs of effective participa-
tion, or (2) the party does not have sufficient resources adequately to compensate
counsel
Hearings: Fees in Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 59 (statement of Susan Goss). "[w]e [National
Resource Center for Consumers of Legal Services] argue for a public interest exception to the
American rule because we feel that litigation in the public interest has greater social implications
than the mere redress of pecuniary loss." Id. at 5-6 (statement of Lenore Otrowsky).
218. One proposal submitted to the ABA's House of Delegates in 1977 provided:
Resolved... That in civil litigation courts and administrative agencies should require
losing parties to pay reasonable attorney fees as an item of costs to prevailing parties
unless (1) the conduct of the losing party and opposing the prevailing parties position
was substantially justified or (2) for the reason an award would (a) be unjust or (b) tend
to have a chilling effect on the utilization of legal remedies or defenses pursued in good
faith.
Id. at 41 (statement of C. Dallas Sands).
219. See note 215 supra.
220. See Bennett v. Cramer, 495 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Wis. 1980). The court stated:
To hold that parties with arguably meritorious claims should be liable for attorney's fees
after they lose at trial would have a chlling impact on potential plaintiffs and retard
Congressional policy.
. . . Had the court believed that Mr. Bennett's [plaintif's] claim was frivolous, unrea-
sonable or groundless, it would have never allowed that issue to go to the jury.
Id. at 193.
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cific policies behind civil rights fee awards. The amended Awards Act,
section 1988, would, with the addition of such a section, provide:
In any civil action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, titles II, VI, and VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and title IX of Public Law 92-318, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. Prevailing plaintiffs should
recover fees unless special circumstances render an award unjust. Prevail-
ing defendants should recover fees only in exceptional circumstances.
The legislative history would amplify the significance of the
changes221 and define the "exceptional circumstances" that warrant de-
fendant fee awards. Exceptional circumstances are vexatious, frivo-
lous, unreasonable, or harassing suits instigated without substantial
justification. Bad faith is not a sine qua non for a defendant award, but
merely one factor for courts to consider when evaluating a litigant's
justification for filing suit. Substantial justification is measured by a
reasonableness standard that essentially examines whether a litigant,
not an attorney, should have foreseen the meritlessness of his claim.
222
When the litigant establishes genuine issues of material fact or the law
is unclear as to the respective parties' rights, substantial justification is
conclusively presumed. 223 To facilitate administration of fee claims
and consistency, explicit evaluation by courts of these fairly specific
guidelines is required. 4
This legislative modification of the civil rights prevailing defendant
221. Courts' discretion is narrow under the same prevailing plaintiff standard. See note 95
supra and accompanying text. Courts' discretion in awarding fees to prevailing defendants is
significantly narrowed and limited to situations in which plaintiffs' causes of action clearly lacked
legal or factual foundation when filed, or in which plaintiffs' suits evidence harassment, bad faith,
or other misconduct.
222. Consideration of a litigant's substantial justification distinguishes the new standard from
the Christiansburg standard. The reasonableness is not measured from the attorney's perspective
because the primary objective of civil rights fee statutes is private enforcement, not punishing
attorneys for misconduct or unreasonableness. Moreover, few attorneys would litigate novel
claims if courts imposed direct fee shifting against the advocate. Other remedies are better
equipped to deal with attorneys who abuse judicial processes and file groundless suits. Imposition
of costs under § 1927, and fees and expenses under civil procedure rules when appropriate, serve
as sufficient deterrents to attorney misconduct. See notes 173, 176 & 179 supra and accompanying
text.
223. This presumption is appropriate, under a reasonableness standard that measures a lay-
man's motivations, when a litigant's attorney has accepted and prosecuted a suit successfully
enough to prevent a court from removing the case from the jury.
224. The trial court should explicitly state its reasoning to facilitate appellate review and pro-
mote certainty. See Davis v. City of Abbeville, 633 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1981).
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fee award standard is necessary to achieve fully private enforcement of
civil rights laws. The current prevailing plaintiff standard has proven
its value as an effective enforcement incentive. Without alteration of
the prevailing defendant standard, however, its capacity to encourage
private parties to seek redress under federal civil rights law is emascu-
lated. Frivolous suits remain a perplexing problem in the civil rights
context. Nevertheless, statutory fee awards should not exalt eradica-
tion of this concern over the private enforcement objective. Irresponsi-
bly liberal fee awards to defendants deter reasonable and justifiable
complaints. The proposed Awards Act prevailing defendant standard
ensures vigorous enforcement by limiting courts' discretion to award
fees to civil rights defendants.
The amended statute thus provides a yardstick to measure the frivol-
ity of a case so that the chancellor need no longer rely on the length of
his foot.
Glenn Eugene Davis
[Vol. 60:75
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/4
